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Until just a few years ago, no organization was tasked with measuring overall 
effectiveness, design, or optimization of DOD’s global supply chain management system. 
As a result, the Strategic Distribution Management Initiative (SDMI) was created as a 
joint venture between Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the United States 
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) charged with enterprise level redesign, 
streamlining, and optimization of the DOD global supply chain. This thesis examines the 
affects of the SDMI implementation on the Army’s two maneuver divisions stationed in 
the Europe.  Specifically, it analyzes affects of SDMI implementation on the eight supply 
support activities located within the two maneuver divisions in USAREUR.   
This thesis studies SDMI impacts on inventory levels; inventory turbulence in the 
SSAs during SDMI implementation; SDMI improvements with respect to readiness; and 
existing barriers to improving velocity. The research indicates that: (1) expected 
inventory reductions were not realized following SDMI implementation, (2) inventory 
turbulence consumes limited resources and is a lucrative target for further improvement, 
(3) there is no evidence that SDMI increased fleet readiness, and (4) backorder rates and 
time, along with sub-optimization of pieces of the DOD supply chain, are significant 
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It has become clear that the Services can no longer afford to do that which suits 
their individual needs, they must look to combine efforts and more importantly assets 
wherever and whenever possible.  In theory this sounds as if there could be countless 
benefits to be had; however in reality, it will be no small undertaking.   The idea of 
sharing assets and efforts across Services let alone commands in the military threatens the 
well-guarded mentality of “this is how we’ve always done it.” Essentially, the military 
has been tasked to do more with less, do it quicker, more efficiently and more reliably. 
In order to address new threats, emerging technologies and ever-changing social 
and economic environments, the military must look for new and different means to 
achieve its goals.  Years worth of lessons learned and after-action reports coupled with 
the tremendous impact of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
on September 11, 2001 further dictate the need for today’s military to adapt, overcome 
and change its very culture in the face of such adversity. 
The volumes of information available at our fingertips via the World Wide Web 
(WWW) serves to clarify how stratified and insular the Services are, in particular with 
respect to logistical support.  In the late 1990’s the highest levels of our Federal 
Government and the U.S. Military realized the need for change and began discussions 
centered on the way the Services conduct their business.  Numerous changes occurred 
during the period from 1990 to 2000 that further exacerbated the need for change 
including: a reduction in the number of military personnel by 33%; an inflation-adjusted 
decrease in DoD budget by more than 28%; an increase in the power projection overseas 
with an increase in the number of deployments up to 55; and a 47% decrease in stockage 
inventory, a decrease of more than $46 billion. [Ref. 1] 
A. OVERVIEW  
1. Problem Statement 
“The USTRANSCOM and DLA partnership has enjoyed measurable success for 
over two years, but is at a point…where it’s time to re-engage, refine, and move 
forward.” [Ref. 2] With the Strategic Distribution Management Initiative (SDMI) at its 
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two and a half year mark, and undergoing a name change by dropping the “initiative,” 
(from here on, SDMI and SD refer to the same program), we are at a point where the 
venture merits a review.  From the May 2002 SD Board of Directors (BOD) meeting 
came several taskers, one in particular (#0205BOD05) is to answer the question: “Have 
Strategic Distribution improvements had effects and impact upon readiness and inventory 
levels?” A particular item of interest (question) of the BOD is “are Strategic Distribution 
improvements resulting in reduced inventories…and consequently saving in inventory 
costs?” Related to that inventory question, we will consider, “To what extent are units 
experiencing inventory turbulence; and what are the ramifications?”  In the same vein, 
one should ask, “Are improvements being made that make a difference to readiness?”  Is 
SDMI influencing requisition cycle time for critical requisitions and ultimately affect 
readiness of fleets?  [Ref. 2] 
2. Purpose 
This thesis examines the effects of the SDMI implementation on the Army’s two 
maneuver divisions stationed in the European Command (EUCOM).  Our primary 
objective is to determine the effect SDMI has had on inventory levels and readiness.  In 
addition to addressing and answering the BOD’s questions, our alternative objectives 
include examination of barriers to improving velocity that still exist while focusing on 
lucrative targets that may impact readiness. 
B. SCOPE 
This thesis will study SDMI goals, objectives and implementation impacts 
pertaining to the eight Class IX Supply Support Activities (SSAs) organic to the two 
Army divisions in the United States Army, Europe (USAEUR).  Specifically, it will 
address inventory levels, inventory turbulence, and requisition cycle time associated with 
the eight SSAs.   
This thesis seeks to answer the following questions: 
• Have Strategic Distribution improvements resulted in reduced inventories?  
 
• Is inventory turbulence and its related costs an area for further scrutiny 
and possible improvement? 
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• Are the SD improvements being made ones that make a significant 
difference to readiness?  
 
• What lucrative targets (in terms of requisition cycle time) exist which have 
a large potential payoff in terms of readiness?     
 
C. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This thesis primarily benefits the SD team by objectively addressing some of the 
questions posed by the BOD.  Moreover, it will address areas for further scrutiny and 
possible improvement commensurate with the goals and objectives stipulated in both the 
SDMI Project Guidance [Ref. 3] and the Project Management Plan [Ref. 4].  It is our goal 
to provide a view of the SDMI program from the ‘micro’ perspective and compare that to 
the ‘macro’ analysis available from the program itself.   Additionally, this thesis might 
provide a new perspective and create discussion on topics not yet considered, as well as 
provide new perspectives on current topics.  
D. ORGANIZATION  
Chapter II will lay the groundwork for the “entering arguments” as the individual 
strategic organizations contributed to SDMI in its early stages.  Additionally, it will 
provide a brief background into the basic core members of the SD through a literature 
review.   Chapter III discusses the methodology used for the analysis.  Chapter IV 






































II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. BACKGROUND- PRE-SDMI ARCHITECTURE 
 This chapter summarizes the literature relating to the entities contributing to and 
participating in the SDMI from its inception.  Additionally, the review discusses basic 
theories, goals and missions of the contributing sources along with the individual entities 
and their current philosophies as each entered the SDMI Program.  
1. Joint Vision 2010/2020 
Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010) was formulated and released by the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff in 1996.  In June 2000, Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020) was released by the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, which further expanded upon the theories and policies of JV 2010.  Collectively, 
the two documents contributed to the framework of the SDMI program.   
To quote the introduction of the JV 2010 document, “Joint Vision 2010 is the 
conceptual template for how America’s Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of 
our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of 
effectiveness in joint war fighting.” [Ref. 5]  Essentially, JV2010 formulated a mission 
foundation upon which the military could build.  It focuses on the technological advances 
of the time, which then was just a mere taste of the breakthroughs we’ve experienced 
since.  The overarching focus of JV2010 was the future of war fighting in the early 21st 
century utilizing improved intelligence and command control centered on information 
technology developments.   Finally, JV 2010 identified four operational concepts that 
would form its basis: Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full Dimensional 
Protection and Focused Logistics.  [Ref. 5] 
Joint Vision 2020 focuses on the transformation process the military is 
undergoing to create “a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military 
operations- persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict.” 
[Ref. 6]  As with JV 2010, the four operational concepts: Dominant Maneuver, Precision 
Engagement, Full Dimensional Protection and Focused Logistics remain primary to the 
Joint Vision.  The overarching theme of JV2020 is full spectrum dominance through 
optimized application of the operational concepts.   Additionally, the focus on the 
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flexibility and responsiveness of the ‘Joint’ environment was stressed even more than 
was in JV2010.  Finally, Joint Vision 2020 does not focus on the materiel aspect of the 
future of the military, rather it focuses more on developing doctrine, effective 
organizations and properly educated and trained leaders and personnel that can take 
advantage of available technology. [Ref. 6] 
2. Velocity Management  
Commissioned in 1995, the Army’s Velocity Management (VM) Initiative has 
completely transformed the way the Army conducts its business.  Centered in the focus of 
VM is material and information flow from providers to users.  VM sought to optimize the 
speed and accuracy of that flow by analyzing processes throughout the establishment.  As 
a result, VM has shown dramatic improvements in the Army’s logistics processes in 
terms of time, quality and cost.  Creating a drastic reduction in materiel delivery time, the 
Army has created a high-velocity, streamlined order fulfillment mechanism.   
Additionally, VM has successfully integrated the repair processes, which further serves 
the users with more readily available repair parts and materiel. [Ref. 7] 
Of key influence to the SD Program was the constant, heavy involvement in the 
VM process by senior leaders throughout the Army.   Furthermore, VM utilized an 
effective process improvement procedure called Define Measure Improve (D-M-I), which 
will be covered later in the discussion on the SDMI Program infrastructure.   The object 
of the DMI procedure is that it is a constant series of steps whereby processes are clearly 
defined, accurately measured, and the results are applied to create process improvements.   
Subsequent changes led to rapid and continuous improvement.  Overall success of the 
VM program is indicated by institutionalization of the potential for achieving and 
sustaining large-scale process improvement based on the success experienced by the 
Army. [Ref. 7] 
Many military organizations have been plagued by the inherent sense of a need 
for an ‘iron mountain’ of supplies and support equipment in order to fulfill its mission.  
This mentality has been brought about by years of disconnect between the “declared” 
reliability of a piece of equipment and its related inventory versus the “actual” reliability 
or Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) and its related inventory attempts to meet those 
actual data points.  Set out to disprove this mindset by focusing on replacing mass with 
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velocity, VM used the parameter of Customer Wait time (CWT) as a key measure for 
improvements.  Customer wait time is defined as, “the total elapsed time between 
issuance of a customer order and satisfaction of that order.  Ideally, CWT will include all 
customer orders, regardless of commodity or source, immediate issues, and backorders 
(and) include issues from wholesale and retail stocks as well as various other 
arrangements.” [Ref. 8]    
One issue here is that the act of “Cannibalization” or as the Army terms, 
“Controlled Substitution,” and its destructive impact on calculating CWT.  The problem 
is that cannibalized or substituted parts are taken from another piece of “downed” 
equipment, which satisfies the immediate problem, but does not negate the need for the 
requisition.  Thus the equipment that the original requisition is ordered against is often 
repaired and fully mission capable (FMC) before the requisition is satisfied by the 
system.   While VM used CWT as a measure of success, it also attempted to relate VM 
improvements to readiness.  The Rand study discussing VM (Reference 7) details an 
Army initiative called Equipment Downtime Analyzer (EDA), which was developed to 
draw a correlation between “measurement activities” and “improvement activities.”  
Essentially, the EDA is supposed to assist in making the connection between VM 
improvements and readiness.  The discussion, however, falls short of stating that EDA 
was able to link VM to any improvements in readiness. [Ref. 7] 
Another aspect of VM that played heavily in the development of SDMI is the 
inventory management process.  The very nature of military logistics demands that 
mobility play a key role in support decisions.  VM sought to optimize inventories 
maintained at the local installations by balancing customer performance objectives, cost 
and mobility issues.   In conjunction with the RAND Corporation, VM aimed at 
improving local fill rates of requisitions by offering a broader, yet shallower inventory 
from which to select.   Two dimensions of inventory performance were defined, 
measured and showed improvements.  “Performance” metrics were defined concerning 




3. High Yield Logistics 
Through High Yield Logistics, the Navy seeks to deliver the highest quality 
service to expeditionary forces around the globe while reducing Navy’s total ownership 
costs.  The High Yield Logistics Initiative has a three-pronged approach.  First is to 
reduce cost through transforming the traditional means of weapon systems support.  By 
concentrating on coordinating between the acquisition and logistics communities, the 
Navy is attempting to address high Operating and Support (O&S) costs for fielded 
systems through inserting technology.  This technology insertion refers to ‘designing in’ 
product support in the product development stages as well as improving the technology 
incorporated in repair parts, engineering them for longer life cycles and optimal operating 
parameters.  Through improving the technology of the repair parts, the Navy hopes to 
realize higher reliability factors in its equipment, less downtime and less repair costs.   
This is one of the more pro-active approaches to addressing the cause of many logistics 
issues, by improving reliability factors of merit, higher MTBF and longer repair cycles, 
an improved logistics support system will naturally follow.  Overall, the Navy envisions 
this initiative as freeing funds for modernizing and recapitalizing current weapon systems 
as well as investing in new weapons systems. [Ref. 9]   
The second approach to High Yield Logistics involves a web-based program 
called One Touch Support which applies business process reengineering concepts by 
identifying best-value suppliers, integrated systems and technology, customer–centered 
metrics and tailored customer support. [Ref. 9]  Taking advantage of the latest web 
technology, the One Touch Support website maintains the highest quality and most up-to-
date information available for today’s logisticians. 
The third approach of High Yield Logistics is the Regional Maintenance Program.  
By distributing maintenance and repair work around throughout a region’s maintenance 
facilities, the program seeks to optimize a maintenance work within a geographic region.  
Overall, a cost savings should occur while the Navy is able to ensure higher utilization of 
personnel and assets.  Combined, these efforts were all considered during the 
development of SDMI. 
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4. Precision Logistics  
Stemming from its emerging operational concepts engendered in the Operational 
Maneuver from the Sea document, the Marine Corps has developed Precision Logistics.    
Faced with these emerging operational concepts, marine commanders are subject to new 
challenges.  Precision Logistics is focused on the commander’s ability to address and 
meet those challenges by creating logistics process improvements based on strategic, 
operational and tactical requirements. [Ref. 10] 
Central priorities to the Precision Logistics plan are: improved equipment 
readiness, enhanced distribution, and the development of a robust logistics command and 
control capability. [Ref. 10]  Of interest to the SDMI program here is that the Marine 
Corps used the D-M-I continuous improvement methodology for its program framework.  
As we’ll show later, this is exactly what the SDMI team utilizes for its program.    
Additionally, SDMI emulated the Marine Corps ‘grass roots’ approach to reengineering 
its logistics system by looking at requisition submission and processing, distribution, 
repair processes, inventory management and consolidation, shipping modes, etc.  
5. Logistics Transformation 
The United States Air Force’s major initiative for reengineering its logistics 
processes is Logistics Transformation.  Much like its sister services, the Air Force is 
focused on increased performance for the war fighter through adapting best government, 
commercial, and academic initiatives and opportunities.   The desired end-state is a 
logistics system that is an integrated, process-oriented logistics and product network 
through focusing on three primary precepts: 
• The role of expeditionary aerospace operations stresses a flexible system that 
is integrated, mobile, and precise to meet evolving requirement of the war 
fighter. 
• Current resource constraints necessitate and Air Force logistics system that 
provides the required performance and is both affordable and effective. 
• Eliminating barriers and optimizing processes will enhance customer 
confidence. 
Finally, Logistics Transformation includes education of its officers and airmen as 




The Defense Logistics Agency has been providing Combat Logistics Support to 
the military since its creation in 1961.  It is an interagency organization that is headed by 
three-star officer drawn from one of the Services on a rotational basis.  In terms of the 
business world, DLA is ranked number 126 of Fortune 500 companies with an annual 
sales and services value of more that $17.8 Billion.  Employing more than 24,000 
civilians and 1,100 active and reserve military personnel, DLA has offices located in 48 
states and 28 countries.  [Ref. 11] 
As with the rest of the military, and much of the business world, DLA has 
transitioned through a series of downsizing efforts to reduce its once massive 
infrastructure.  It has combined a number of its duplicated/like services and streamlined 
numerous processes.  Currently DLA operates 22 Distribution Centers, supporting 1372 
weapons systems, maintaining more than $84.7 Billion in inventory and handling 18 
million requisitions annually.  Recently, DLA’s focus has been on “Giving the War 
Fighters What They Need…” while maintaining reduced inventories, lower costs, and 
providing faster reliable service, “from Logistics Mass to Logistics Velocity.”  
Obviously, these numbers indicate the tremendous challenge the SD program faces when 
dealing with an agency of this size. [Ref. 11] 
In addition to the Distribution Centers, DLA maintains several ‘Lead Centers’ that 
purchase and manage a variety of supplies and services including fuel, food, clothing, 
construction supplies, electronics, medical supplies, and distribution and disposal 
reutilization services.   Research conducted for this thesis covered material and services 
provided by a number if not all of these locations.   The following is a brief summary of 
each location and its primary materiel/service it provides: [Ref. 11] 
• Defense Energy Support Center (DESC)- Fort Belvoir, Va. Fuels, gas and 
electrical power. 
• Defense Supply Center, Columbus (DSCC), Columbus, OH. Maritime and 
land weapon system support. 
• Defense Supply Center Richmond, (DSCR), Richmond VA. Aviation 
support. 
• Defense Supply Center Philadelphia (DSCP), Philadelphia PA. Food, 
clothing, medical, general and industrial supplies services. 
10 
• *Defense Distribution Center (DDC), New Cumberland, PA. Operates a 
worldwide network of 24 distribution depots that receive, store, and issue 
supplies.  The depots are strategically located to enhance rapid distribution 
of critical military items. 
• Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS), Battle Creek, MI. 
Handles property disposal of items from vehicles and office equipment to 
scrapping of Naval ships and hazardous materials.  
Additionally, DLA maintains two headquarters in Europe and the Pacific theater 
to provide customer assistance, liaison services, war planning interfaces and logistics 
support to the Commanders in Chief and their service component commands:   
• DLA Pacific, Taegu, Korea. Provides Customer assistance and services 
support to the Commanders in Chief, Pacific Command and his service 
component commands.  
• DLA Europe, Wiesbaden, Germany.  Serves as the focal point for tracking 
all war fighter issues from all DLA activities in Europe and the continental 
United States. 
* This location (DDC) houses the Consolidation and Containerization Point (CCP), 
which is the primary shipping platform for nearly all material shipped to locations in our 
study. [Ref. 11] 
7. USTRANSCOM 
The United States Transportation Command, headquartered at Scott AFB, Ill., 
was established in 1987 and is one of nine U.S. unified commands.  Tasked with the 
coordination of people and transportation assets, it is the single manager of America’s 
global defense transportation system.   The number one priority of USTRANSCOM is 
responding to the needs of DoD’s war fighting commanders.  Composed of three 
component commands: (1) Air Mobility Command, (2) Military Sealift Command, and 
(3) Military Traffic Management Command, USTRANSCOM is responsible for 
coordinating missions worldwide using military and commercial transportation assets. 
[Ref.12].  Currently, Commander, USTRANSCOM is “dual-hatted” as he is commanding 
both USTRANSCOM and AMC-AF. 
Air Mobility Command (AMC-AF), managed by the Air Force, is headquartered 
at Scott Air Force Base.  Capable of providing refueling services and delivery of 
personnel and material anywhere in the world in a matter of hours, the Air Force uses a 
number of airframes to support their needs including: C-17 Globemaster III, C-5 Galaxy, 
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C-141 Starlifter, KC-135 Stratotanker, KC-10 Extender, and C-9 Nightingale.   
Additionally, in the case of national emergencies, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) 
can provide a fleet of commercial aircraft in order to provide transportation of military 
personnel and assets. [Ref. 12] 
Military Sealift Command (MSC), managed by the Navy, is responsible for 
worldwide sea-transportation of military material during peace and war.  Employing both 
military and civilian assets including Fast Sealift and Ready Reserve ships, MSC has 
three primary functions: 
• Surge Sealift- Used to move military equipment and supplies from 
CONUS to theaters of operations. 
• Prepositioned sealift- Material that is pre-positioned in strategic locations 
around the world.  Once activated, falls under USTRANSCOM’s 
command. 
• Sustainment sealift- Provides continuous logistical support to forward 
deployed/activated forces.      [Ref. 12] 
 
Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) provides the overland lift 
services and is the primary traffic manager for USTRANSCOM.  The primary mission of 
MTMC is to provide service to DoD and the mobilization community through responsive 
planning, crisis response actions, traffic management, terminal operations, integrated 
transportation systems and deployability engineering.  Along with contracting for 
commercial transportation resources, MTMC manages more than 12,000 shipping 
containers, 1,350 rail and tank cars and 142 miles of Government–owned railroad lines. 
[Ref. 12] 
8. AMC 
Army Materiel Command is the primary provider of logistical support to Army 
forces.  Essentially, “if a soldier shoots it, drives it, flies it, wears it, or eats it, AMC 
provides it." [Ref. 13]   More specifically, AMC’s services range from research and 
development of sophisticated weapons systems to the ordering maintenance stocking and 
distribution of spare parts.  Additionally, AMC acquires all the ammunition utilized by all 
military services as well as support foreign military interests by conducting sales of 
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equipment and negotiation of agreement s for co-production of U.S. Weapons systems by 
foreign nations.  
Headquartered in Alexandria Virginia, AMC maintains some 149 locations 
worldwide in over 40 states and 38 countries operated by more than 50,000 military and 
civilian employees.  By focusing on integrating technology, acquisition and logistics, 
AMC has been proactive in modernizing and developing itself to remain competitive.   
Finally, part of AMC’s mission statement is that they are “heavily involved in making the 
Army more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable.” 
[Ref. 13]  
B. SDMI INFRASTRUCTURE 
1. Background 
Recognizing the transitions military logistics organizations have undergone and 
continue to face coupled with the visions outlined in Joint Vision 2010 and 2020, such as 
Dominant Maneuver and Focused Logistics; the entities involved with SD determined 
that their process changes should be focused on velocity and consistency.  Velocity 
describes how rapidly operational sustainability can be delivered to the war fighter in 
peace and in war.  Furthermore, the SD team recognized that the war fighting ‘customer’ 
has a wealth of exposure and understanding of how the civilian sector business world has 
grasped effective supply chain management and transportation and used it to its fullest 
advantage.  Finally, taking into consideration the Service’s individual approaches to 
modern logistics such as Precision Logistics, High-Yield Logistics, Logistics 
Transformation and Velocity Management, the SD team agreed that; “Our efforts to 
improve strategic distribution must be a cohesive, integrated effort across the spectrum of 
material acquisition, transportation movement, and initial in-theater distribution.” [Ref. 3] 
2. SDMI Defined  
This program is breaking new ground, as it is the first single-effort to define, 
measure and improve the design and overall effectiveness of DoD’s worldwide 
distribution, transportation and supply chain management system.   Essentially, it is a 
charter for an enterprise-level analytical review and redesign in order to optimize DoD’s 
supply chain.  Per the SDMI Program Guidance, the following summarizes what SD is 
supposed to be: 
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The Strategic Distribution Management Initiative (SDMI) is a joint effort 
headed by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command 
(USCINCTRANS) and the Director, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), in 
consultation and coordination with the Military Services and other defense 
agencies, to improve DoD's distribution system.  The SDMI is a 
distribution/sustainment enabler to identify and implement value added 
distribution services.  It provides a forum for coordinating the integration 
of joint material acquisition, transportation, and distribution process 
improvement activities among member organizations.  Under this 
initiative, appropriate policy and joint process recommendations will be 
forwarded through the Military Services to the Joint Staff and OSD for 
approval.       [Ref. 3] 
 
3. SDMI Vision and Mission 
The Vision Statement of the SDMI program is: 
An optimized global system providing responsive, reliable, end-to-end  
distribution service to our customer – both peacetime and wartime. [Ref.3] 
The Mission of SDMI incorporates this vision statement into a forward-thinking 
mentality with regard to distribution requirements.   By reviewing and thoroughly 
analyzing all aspects of civilian and military processes including acquisition, storage, 
transportation and distribution practices, the SD team plans to incorporate the vast array 
of lessons learned along with the latest technology to create its desired optimized 
distribution system of the future.  Throughout the process, the overarching vision and 
mission of SD will be revisited to ensure that all changes are guided toward a “cohesive 
and integrated effort.”  [Ref. 3] 
4. SDMI Goals and Objectives 
The overall goal of the SD program is to provide improved end-to-end 
distribution to war fighter customers in times of peace and war.  The focus will be on 
improving overall distribution and transportation services and supply chain management 
across a global system during peacetime operations while ensuring the capability to 
transition to wartime scenario with ease.   
  In pursuit of its goals, the SDMI Project Guidance [Ref. 3] lists the following 
objectives: 
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• Analysis/optimization of strategic linkages with intra-theater distribution 
processes to facilitate an integrated supply chain management process.  
• A comprehensive analysis of strategic distribution requirements and capacity 
across the full spectrum of operations.  Actions and supporting tasks required of 
this objective will require:  
• Identification of policy, procedure, and process impediments to optimal 
distribution chain performance.  
• Identification and improvement of processes in the strategic transportation 
and distribution system to reduce Customer Wait Time (CWT) and 
ensure credible Time Definite Deliveries (TDD). 
• Development and implementation of a capability to ensure "predictive 
delivery" in the supply chain process.  
• Integration of vendor and contractor shipments into the defense global 
distribution system – in peace and in war. 
• Coordination with Services and recommendation of policy change initiatives to 
the Joint Staff and OSD. (SDMI Project Guidance, 2000)  [Ref. 3] 
Figure II-1is excerpted from the SDMI Project Guidance [Ref. 3] and provides a 
visual depiction of the inter-relationship and integration SDMI intends for the Services. 
 
Figure 1.   SDMI Integrated Distribution Chain [Ref. 3] 
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Recognizing that SDMI is but one of the numerous vital programs being 
implemented throughout the military; the SD team ensured that consideration be given to 
other relative process improvement programs such as: Joint Theater Distribution, Joint 
Test and Evaluation (JTD JT&E) and the Joint Logistics War fighting Initiative (JLWI).  
Coordination and collaboration among these programs and the Services is an important 
facet of the program as the SD officials recognize that the very intent of the program is to 
diminish or completely eradicate “stovepipes” and “rice-bowls” among the Services.  
[Ref. 4] 
5. Scope of SDMI 
Originally, SDMI was not designed to cover the entire deployment/redeployment 
process.  Rather, the initiative is bounded, starting with detailed analysis of current 
acquisition procedures, through to the receipt of requested material at a Port of 
Debarkation (POD).  Interim processes to be reviewed under the SDMI program include; 
“scrutinizing activities used to submit, receive, and fill supply requisitions, conduct 
transportation movement to a Port of Embarkation (POE), conduct receipt activities at the 
POE and transportation and receipt at a POD.” [Ref. 3]  The final stage of the SDMI 
program analysis is to examine material movement from the POD (or OCONUS Retail 
Site) to the customer.  However, for the purposes of this study, the point at which the 
material is received at the POD or Retail Site is the ending point for SDMI analysis. 
6. SDMI Organization 
SDMI developed its program centered on four primary groups of stakeholders; 
they are: 
• Customer- The “receiving end” perspective of all distribution efforts, in 
times of peace and war. 
• Suppliers of Material- Includes those who repair reusable stock as well 
as those who control organic depot and commercially produced stock 
assets. 
• Providers to the process- Including the Services, DLA and 
USTRANSCOM, as those activities who provide support to customers 
with timely delivery of required material in support of their mission. 
• Higher Authority- For the SDMI Program, this refers to the Office of 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff.  [Ref. 3] 
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7. SDMI Management Structure 
By combining resident expertise from both USTRANSCOM and DLA, an 
integrated management structure was formed to collectively manage the SD initiative. 
Headed by the SDMI Senior Partners, Director, DLA and Deputy Commander, 
USTRANSCOM, functional committees were designed along the lines of an Air 
Distribution, Surface-only Distribution and Stockage Management Committees.  Each 
committee is responsible for a detailed and exhaustive review and analysis of the current 
processes within its particular functional perspective.  However, the SDMI guidance was 
clear in stating that each functional committee should also actively pursue open dialog 
cross-functionally in order to identify and develop fully cohesive and integrated 
recommendations. [Ref. 3] 
Program oversight is the responsibility of the Senior Partners while the daily 
operations of the program is managed by an Executive Agent with support from an SDMI 
Core Team.  The Executive Agent coordinates all functions of the program from 
integrating committee actions, issues and recommendations, to organizing and scheduling 
SDMI Board of Directors (BOD) meetings.    Co-directors are responsible for attending 
and supporting the interagency BOD meetings and conducting periodic reviews with the 
Senior Partners and other OSD/Joint Staff logistics steering groups. [Ref. 3] 
Management responsibility is assigned to Co-Directors; Director of Operations 
and Logistics, USTRANSCOM (TCJ3/J4); and Commanding General, Defense 
Distribution Command (CG DDC) who jointly provide direct daily oversight and 
management of the program and its activities.  Excerpted from the SDMI project 
guidance, the following list summarizes composition and responsibilities of the primary 
entities in the SDMI infrastructure: 
• Board of Directors (BOD).  Ensure close integration and cooperation 
with related distribution process improvement efforts.  The BOD will meet 
quarterly and provide advice and recommendations on opportunities to 
improve overall defense distribution processes.  Board members include 
flag level representation from OSD, the Services, the Joint Staff, Service 
Acquisition Organizations, and Component Commands of 
USTRANSCOM. 
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• Executive Agent.  The Executive Agent, acting on behalf of the Co-
Directors will ensure integration of SDMI Committee actions, and prepare 
issues for presentation to the BOD, and DCINCTRANS/Director DLA.  
The Executive Agent also manages allocation of analytical support to the 
functional committees to support overall SDMI requirements, and 
develop/propose issues for further analysis.  Manages the daily activities 
of a dedicated SDMI Core Team, in coordination with CG, DDC. 
   
• SDMI Core Team.  A small, dedicated core team, consisting of 
government and contractor personnel, to act in direct support of the 
Executive Agent.  They will serve in a "clearing house" capacity for 
routine SDMI matters and administer day-to-day SDMI transactions.  
Specific Core Team responsibilities include the establishment, 
maintenance, and administration of a SDMI Project Management Plan.  
Further, they will track the quality of integration efforts of this program's 
numerous initiatives. 
   
• RAND Analysis Team.  The RAND analytical team will, in support of 
the government's Project Monitor, provide analytical support to 
DLA/USTRANSCOM for use in applying proven reengineering methods 
to the strategic distribution process.  They will respond to the direction of 
the SDMI Monitor, when performing end-to-end, SDMI integration 
analysis, and Committee Chairs when conducting more narrowly focused 
examinations required of the function nodes. 
 
• Functional Committees/Chairs.  Committees are responsible for 
examining the distribution processes in their functional areas for 
determination of where improvements can be made to achieve our SDMI 
objectives, and to develop improvement proposals, and strategies for 
implementation of their recommended changes.  Each committee is 
responsible for providing recommendations based on process analysis and 
fact-based derivations.  
[Ref. 3] 
 
As mentioned earlier, these committees while focusing on analysis within their 
functional perspectives, must also actively collaborate between committees and consider 
viewpoints of the stakeholders as well.  Specific focal points of each committee include: 
 
• Lay out and understand their respective processes, to include all critical 
nodes; establish specific beginning and end point of each process/sub-
process.  
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• Establish a baseline; develop a means of collecting data/information and 
collect data/information against the baseline.  
• Establish improvement objectives for each process/sub-process and the 
performance metrics to be used to measure improvement.  
• Identify potential changes or improvements that might increase speed and 
accuracy of distribution management.  Formulate strategy and courses of 
action to test, and implement change, if successfully tested.  
• Record and analyze results of pilot implementations; subsequently provide 
results and fact-based recommendations (recommendations should address 
expected changes to DoD policy, process and systems).  
• Measure and report the results of implemented operational processes; offer 
correction recommendations as appropriate.      [Ref. 3] 
 
Management activities throughout the SDMI program are tasked to administer, 
analyze, initiate, measure, identify, create and initiate change to current functional 
processes.  Per references 3 and 4, each organizational entity under the SDMI program 
was given direction and focus which includes: 
 
Stockage Management Committee - Chaired by Deputy Commander DDC.  
- Analyze current and emerging product support requirements, processes, and 
systems associated with supply chain management and distribution for the DOD.  
Identify product support, distribution problems and improvement opportunities.  
Recommend changes and courses of action to the BOD, and implement approved 
changes.  
- Model, redesign, prototype, and implement approved changes. 
- Develop ideas, approaches, understanding for the explicit use of DLA and 
Service ICP's.  Partner with DLA and Service ICP's to foster product support 
concepts from an integrated approach in pursuit of OSD goals to include "shift to 
commercial practices". 
- Consider alternatives and facilitate stock positioning recommendations to 
achieve overall DoD supply chain efficiencies (the committee recognizes that 
participating ICP's [Service and DLA] are solely responsible for the management 
of their stocks). 
- Establish process to eliminate policy, procedure and process impediments to 
optimal product support and/or physical distribution.  
 
Surface and Air Distribution Committees 
- Chaired by CG MTMC and AMC/DO respectively.  
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- Analyze current and emerging surface and air distribution requirements, 
processes, and systems.  Identify surface and air distribution problems and 
process improvement opportunities.  Recommend changes and course of actions 
to the BOD, and implement approved changes.  
- Model, redesign, prototype, and recommend changes.  
- Improve efficiency and effectiveness of distribution process to the ultimate 
customer through comprehensive analysis of surface and air distribution 
requirements including wartime capacity and implement approved changes. 
         [Ref. 3, 4] 
Executive Agent and SDMI Core Team  
- Create and orchestrate an SDMI Project Management Plan (PMP). 
- Track linkage and analyze/ensure the integration of SDMI initiatives. 
- Orchestrate SDMI end-to-end analysis; provide recommendations to Co-
directors on future direction. 
- Conduct SDMI resource management.  Prepare and manage the SDMI budget; 
redirect program resources within constraints of contracts, agreements, and 
available funds to mitigate risk and ensure on-time delivery of quality 
deliverables within budget. 
- Provide a communications protocol and ensure dissemination of the SDMI 
information/actions throughout the DOD. 
- Establish and maintain a SDMI repository; establish repository guidelines. 
- Coordinate and announce all SDMI executive meetings. 
- Provide routine direction to the SDMI management structure, including 
redirection as required. 
-   Initiate actions to acquire contract support for the program. 
[Ref. 3, 4] 
RAND Analysis Team  
- Conduct baseline analysis of current SDMI processes; determine current process 
performance; define relevant processes. 
- Accomplish end-to-end SDMI system analysis, seeking current integration gaps 
and future opportunities. 
- Perform diagnostic analysis; identify potential areas for improvement. 
- Develop and support a means to measure and report the results of D-M-I 
actions.  Measure flows of material in terms of quantities, customer wait time, 
volumes, weights, and costs. 
- Provide recommendations and implementing strategies to the Executive Agent 
and Functional Committees. 
[Ref. 3, 4] 
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8. SDMI Analytical Methodology 
Focusing on creating change that was integrated and cohesive across all 
boundaries, the SDMI team sought to select a process improvement procedure that was 
capable of accurately defining and measuring current supply chain management 
procedures.  They decided on a rational methodology derived from commercial practices 
and in fact was the format used in the Army’s highly effective Velocity Management 
process called the DMI methodology where: 
Define current processes and issues.  Essentially conduct a step-by-step review of 
all processes and clearly describe these steps. 
Measure current processes using mapping and analysis process controls.  This 
process involves understand the current processes involved; diagnosing the performance 
drivers of each individual process; and monitor changes and improvements to those 
processes.  
Improve current processes by measuring the impact of proposed process, system, 
or policy changes.  This step involves designing changes to existing processes or 
developing entirely new processes; defining goals and milestones for them; and 
experimenting and implementing the changes. 
Figure-2 below, excerpted from the SDMI Project Management Plan [Ref. 4] 
provides the SDMI vision of how the DMI methodology is supposed to function.  
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Figure 2.   SDMI Management Process- DMI [Ref. 4]  
 
Each committee is expected to thoroughly employ the DMI methodology in its 
functional analysis.  Based on the outcomes, the committees should develop “baseline” 
processes for their respective fields.  Once the baselines are developed, the committees 
should look for impediments or process degraders that might require review for validity 
and possible change.  Also, the committees should develop specific beginning and end 
points as part of the process definition. [Ref. 4] 
C.  BACKGROUND TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 After studying the SDMI Project Guidance and the SDMI Project Management 
Plan (references 3,4) and at the same time considering the questions posed at the May 
2002 BOD Meeting (reference 2), we generated the research basis for this thesis.  The 
following discussion provides the background to the research questions and is the basis 
for further analysis in chapters III and IV.   
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1. Authorized Stockage Lists 
During the SD Board of Directors meeting in May 2002, a brief was provided 
concerning “SD Program Changes” which stated that one particular manner Strategic 
Distribution was attempting to measure success was through leaner inventories and 
reduced infrastructure [Ref. 2].  Two recent National Defense Magazine articles are 
relative to this discussion of inventory levels and mobility.  In Sandra Erwin’s July 2002 
article, she pointed out that the Logistics Transformation Task Force was directed to 
figure out ways for the Army to reduce its “logistics footprint,” to become more 
deployable and to improve the quality of the logistics services to forces in the field [Ref. 
14].  In a similar article published in May 2001, Harold Kennedy postulated that the 
Army is making an effort to transform itself into a lighter, more deployable force.  It also 
reaffirmed the goal of reducing the “logistical footprint” of its combat units. [Ref. 15]  
Similarly, an April 1999 article written by Fritz Crytzer, Supply Policy Division, 
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department of the Army, stated that, 
“As Velocity Management initiatives reduce OST, fewer parts are required to be stocked 
at the ASL level.”  The article’s opening postulation suggests “Recent changes in Army 
retail supply policy will reduce stockage levels of repair parts in the field and move the 
Army toward a distribution-based logistics system.”  The concepts of Time Definite 
Delivery and “predictive delivery” are tenets that complement and build upon the 
“distribution-based logistics system.”  The article also stated, “repair parts inventories at 
the retail level are being reduced,” which also is an expected outcome of the SDMI. [Ref. 
16] 
2.   Inventory Turbulence   
The research question on this topic was selected for three reasons, (1) because it is 
relative to our first two ASL research questions and provides us more insight into the 
discussion of ASL changes over time, (2) the study of inventory turbulence helps us 
understand its impact upon the SDMI program in an environment of scarce resources and, 
(3) the metric of inventory turbulence, and tracking it as a measure of performance, is in 
keeping with the spirit of the SDMI Project Management Plan’s Data Collection and 
Measurement Plan [Ref. 4].     
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Inventory Turbulence often results from periodic additions, reductions, and 
eliminations (deletions) of repair parts from the SSAs Authorized Stockage Lists.  A 
small portion of these changes to the ASLs occur throughout a given year as adjustments 
made based on directives, FEDLOG updates, Interchangeability & Substitutability 
updates, etc.  The majority of changes to the ASL occur normally once a year as a result 
of the annual ASL Review process.  Significant changes may also result from stockage 
level model changes (e.g. EOQ, Demand Analysis, Dollar Cost Banding).  
At the end of the ASL Review process, a portion of inventory items are deleted 
from the ASL.  When items are deleted from the ASL, they generally become excess, for 
which materiel release orders (MROs) are created.  These items must be picked or pulled 
from the location in the inventory, documented, packaged, and shipped to the Theater 
Central Retention Account for serviceable excess Class IX.  The Theater classifies 
serviceable excess as either NAMI (Non-Army Managed Items) or AMI (Army Managed 
Items).  Non-Army Managed Items excess review is conducted once every three months. 
Anything that exceeds the Retention Level or twice the RO is either sent back to the 
Continental United States, to the Consolidation and Containerization Point for 
redistribution, or to the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO).  The 
Theater Materiel Management Center analyzed their output and found that for NAMI 
items:  
78% of serviceable items less than $100 go to DRMO 
22% of serviceable items less than $100 went to CONUS 
30% of serviceable items greater than $100 went to DRMO 
70% of serviceable items greater than $100 went to CONUS     [Ref. 17] 
 
This thesis will consider ASL Inventory Turbulence in its most conservative sense 
by analyzing the effects of deleting items from the ASL and re-adding the same items 
within the period of our study.  
3.  Readiness 
We chose to study SDMI’s impact on readiness and look at readiness related 
research questions primarily because we desired to address the Board of Directors tasker 
#020BOD05 (Have increases in Readiness been realized due to SD Improvements?). 
Even beyond the tasker, we wished to address this topic because it is the ultimate 
24 
measure of success to the Army in the field as well as throughout the Services.  In 
defining itself, SDMI states, “it is an agile global distribution network…in peace and 
war…and a partnership that is Readiness focused” [Ref. 1].  Furthermore, a major tenet 
of Strategic Distribution is that “Supply Chain Improvements Must be Measured Based 
on Real Customer Outcomes”.  One means Strategic Distribution stated that it intended to 
measure success was by “Improved Readiness” [Ref. 18].    
We begin our study of readiness by studying fleet readiness trends in the two 
divisions in United States Army Europe.  Fleet Readiness is the archetypical measure and 
definition of readiness.  Improvements in Customer Wait Time, Order Ship Time, 
Reliability, and Stockage Management are all objectives in support of the ultimate goal 
of improving readiness.  One would be accurate in saying that all roads lead to readiness.   
Beyond simply addressing the readiness question head-on, we also intend to look 
at areas that may lead to possible improvement in readiness.  We will compare supply 
pipeline segmented processes for Defense Logistics Agency and Army Materiel 
Command items heading into United States Army Europe through the Consolidation and 
Containerization Point for readiness related requisitions.  Additionally, we will look at 
backorder percentages and related number of days in backorder status for the same fleets 
we use to answer our readiness question. 
 
D.  SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a review of the entities that contribute and/or participate in 
the SD program, or have bearing on our thesis topic.  We began with a description of 
individual primary ‘players’ and their perspective on the current and future status of 
military logistics.  Next, we provided a brief description of the SDMI program and its 
basic tenets.  Finally, we ended with a discussion on the formulation of the research 
questions for this thesis.  Chapter III will discuss the methodology we used to address our 



































This chapter will outline the methodology utilized in considering SD’s impact on 
readiness and inventory levels for the two Army Divisions located in EUCOM over the 
life of the SDMI Program.  To begin with, the chapter will introduce measurement 
questions that were developed to further support the primary research questions.  Next, a 
description of the research tools and data collection methods will be presented.  Finally, 
the chapter will conclude with a summary of the contents of this chapter.   
1. Measurement Questions 
In order to fully analyze the primary research questions form Chapter two, we 
developed several more specific, supporting measurement questions that will enable us to 
fully analyze the data.   These questions help us answer the BOD questions more directly 
by focusing on particular facets of our primary research questions.   The following 
measurement questions are germane to the primary questions in italics: 
 
Have Strategic Distribution improvements resulted in reduced inventories? 
• Have the number of ASL lines stocked changed significantly across the 
eight Class IX SSAs over the SDMI time period? What specific changes 
have occurred to DLA supported inventory items?  
 
• Has the depth of DLA sourced items stocked in the eight Class IX SSAs 
increased, decreased, or remained unchanged over the SDMI time period?  
 
Is inventory turbulence and its related costs an area for further scrutiny and 
possible improvement? 
 
• What is the magnitude of turbulence in the eight Class IX Authorized 
Stockage Lists (using a narrow definition)? What are the costs and 
ramifications involved?  
 




• Have Strategic Distribution initiatives/improvements been associated with 
increased fleet readiness? 
 
What lucrative targets (in terms of requisition cycle time) exist which have a large 
potential payoff in terms of readiness?     
 
• Is their a difference in how long it takes a Defense Logistics Agency 
source of supply to cut the Materiel Release Order, ship an item, and get it 
to the East Coast Consolidation & Containerization Point (CCP) for 
Priority-02 (high priority) requisitions compared to how long it takes an 
Army Materiel Command source of supply to accomplish the same task?  
 
• What percent of the Priority 02 (high priority) requisitions for FY01, 
broken out by Defense Logistics Agency and Army Materiel Command 
sources of supply, and further broken down by critical weapon system 
and/or fleet, go into backorder status at their wholesale source of supply? 
For those Priority-02 requisitions that do go into backorder status, how 
long is the average backorder in number of days? 
B. ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
This section provides a detailed description of the analysis utilized for this thesis. 
We begin with a general overview and then follow with a more detailed description of 
each research area.  In order to analyze inventory levels, we limited the research area to a 
fixed area of operation with relatively constant customers.   To address turbulence, 
inventory levels were compared on a time basis covering the period just prior to the 
implementation of SDMI through to the present.  Depth and breadth of inventory was 
measured and considered to be an accurate indicator of inventory levels for the purpose 
of analyzing changes over time.   
In considering the question of readiness, we considered high priority requisitions 
(Priority-02) as being directly linked to readiness as Priority-02 requisitions are typically 
submitted for items that have rendered weapon systems as non-mission capable.  That is, 
Priority-02 requisitions typically represent a piece of “downed” equipment, which is vital 
to the mission of a unit.  The longer the cycle time in fulfilling those Priority-02 
requisitions, the longer time vital equipment is inoperable; ultimately leading to degraded 
readiness.  High priority requisitions are not the only indicator of readiness however; they 
are directly linked to readiness.   Further discussion of the priority system will appear in 
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section four of this chapter.  To measure cycle times of the Priority-02 requisitions, we 
analyzed; (1) the time elapsed from a wholesale storage site (i.e. Depot) to the 
Consolidation and Containerization Point (CCP) for both AMC and DLA materiel; (2) 
the Order Ship Time (OST) by system; (3) the percentage of Priority-02 requisitions that 
went into backorder status; and (4) the amount of time those requisitions spent in 
backorder.  
1. Research Site and Data Sources 
Based on the tremendous breadth of the SDMI program, we realized that we 
would be unable to address its impact on readiness and inventory levels on a worldwide 
scale.   We decided that we would need to focus our research on a portion of the system 
that would serve as a representative “snapshot” of the entire system; for this we chose 
United States Army, Europe (USAREUR).   Furthermore, we chose the Army’s two 
Divisions stationed within USAREUR, 1st Armored Division and 1st Infantry Division. 
In order to study the inventory levels over time we analyzed the four Class IX 
Supply Support Activities (SSAs) belonging to each division.  Each division has one 
Main Support Battalion, two Forward Support Battalions, and one Aviation Support 
Battalion.  Each of these support battalions runs a Class IX Supply Support Activity in 
support of a maneuver brigade combat team.  In the case of the Main Support Battalion, 
they support the divisional separates including the Air Defense Artillery Battalion, the 
Signal Battalion, the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Battalion, and many other 
separate battalions and companies.  Additionally, the Main Support Battalion (MSB) also 
serves as primary backup support to the other three SSAs.  Thus, in our analysis we 
considered four SSAs per division and a total of eight SSAs across both divisions.  
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It’s important to point out that the eight SSAs considered in our study are 
“tactical” SSAs meaning that they must be mobile, able to pickup and move with their 
supported customers across the battlefield.  In fact, in accordance with Army Regulation 
710-2, SSAs, “supporting a brigade must be able to move 90% of the ASL in a single trip 
with their organic vehicles within 30 minutes; the remaining 10 percent should be moved 
with 4 hours.”  These elements should strive to attain 100% mobility (6 of 8 of our SSAs 
are in this category).  Main Support Battalion (MSB) SSAs (the remaining two in our 
study) must be able to deploy with 50 percent in the first shuttle. [Ref. 19]  
Each SSA is assigned a Routing Identifier Code (RIC), a three digit alphanumeric 
code much like a common zip code.  Each and every activity in the military has its own 
individual RIC; SSAs are often referred to by RIC alone.  Table 1 lists the SSAs and their 
associated RICs, which were part of this thesis.  
DODAAC RIC UNIT
WK4GA8 AMX B 47 FSB
WK4GAH ANF B 501 FSB
WK4BM9 WQR D 123 MSB
WK4BNX WQT B 127 ASB AVN
W90A0E WQ2 A 299 FSB
WK4GF3 WQ4 B 601 ASB AVN
WK4GE4 WQW 701ST MSB
WK4GD0 WQZ B 201 FSB  
Table 1.   Routing Identifier Codes for SSAs (unit) 
 
To study the question of what impact SD was having on inventory levels we 
determined to study both the number (breadth) of Authorized Stockage List (ASL) lines, 
as well as the depth of each stocked item in the ASL (also called “eaches”), across the 
span of the SD time period.  The three points in time we selected were February 1999 
(pre-SDMI), October 2001 (mid-point in our period of study), and a current picture in 
June 2002 (a mature SD point in time).  
Our source files for inventory analysis were Availability Balance Files (ABF) 
taken as snapshots in those three time periods.  Within these files we were able to focus 
on three important data fields—NIIN, RO, OH and RIC SOS.  
 The NIIN, National Item Identification Number, is a unique nine-character code 
assigned to each item of supply purchased, stocked, or distributed within the Federal 
Government.  The NIIN is used as the common denominator for an item of supply.  
Requisition Objective (RO) tells us how much of the item the SSA is planning to stock.  
The On-Hand (OH) quantity tells us how much of the RO is currently physically on-hand 
in the SSA.  Next, the RIC-SOS, or Routing Identifier Code-Source of Supply, is an 
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indicator of what source of supply at the wholesale level (i.e. GSA, DLA, AMC) the 
particular item is supported from.  Predominantly, most of the items found stocked at the 
SSAs are from either the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) or the Army Materiel 
Command (AMC).  
In addressing the question “What is the magnitude of turbulence in the eight Class 
IX Authorized Stockage Lists and its related costs and ramifications?” we used a narrow 
definition.  We analyzed data from three different years, specifically 1999, 2001, and 
2002; then compared each of these years against one another.  Our narrow definition of 
turbulence is: stocked in 1999, not stocked in 2001, and re-added in 2002.  Furthermore, 
we used both RO quantities and OH quantities in addressing any monetary impacts, and 
use the number of stocked/deleted lines and their associated volume (eaches) to address 
all other ramifications.  
To answer the question “Have Strategic Distribution initiatives/improvements 
been associated with increased fleet readiness?” we studied data gathered, archived, and 
provided to us by the Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA).  They maintain the Readiness 
Integrated Data Base (RIDB), which is a Department of the Army (DA-level) database 
containing consolidated equipment readiness data from active army units.  The readiness 
data is automatically generated monthly from the Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS) 
Army Materiel Status System (AMSS) and forwarded electronically through the Standard 
Army Maintenance System (SAMS) to RIDB.  The consolidated readiness data in RIDB 
is used at all command levels up through Headquarters, Department of the Army Staff. 
We analyzed the same fleets which are later addressed under the backorder percent and 
number of days analysis which include: M1, M2, HEMTT, M113 APC, MLRS, and 
M939 Bobtails.  Finally, we considered these fleets for both 1st Armored Division and 
1st Infantry Division.   
 Another major source from which we drew data files was document history and 
archived data housed in Logistics Intelligence File (LIF) records.  The LIF data we used 
in the analysis contained only high priority (Priority-02) requisitions originating from, or 
routed through, the same aforementioned eight divisional SSAs.  Additionally, all 
requisitions we considered were entered into the Defense Automated Addressing System 
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(DAAS) and were subsequently routed to a wholesale source of supply.  Furthermore, all 
requisitions considered in the analysis had a Master Inventory Record Posting (MIRP) 
date in FY01 at the storage SSA, which is the same as saying these items, had a D6S 
(wholesale receipt) at the SSA in FY01.  To say it a third way…these high priority 
requisitions had all been receipted at the requesting SSA between 1 OCT 00 and 30 SEP 
Table 2.   Abbreviat
01. A sample LIF data string is shown in Table 2. 
ed LIF String  
The LIF data provid to each and every high 
priority
t Date- the date the requisition was created by the 
 
 estdate: Establish Date- the date the record/requisition was established and/or 
 
 mrodate: Material Release Order Date- the date the wholesale source of 
 
 depship:  Depot Ship Date- the date the source of supply confirmed shipment 
 
 ccpr: Consolidation and Containerization Point Receipt- the date the 
 
 mirp:  Master Inventory Record Posting- the “receipt” date entered on the 
 
docdate estdate mrodate depship mirp ost bkorder sos ric fsc niin
1058 1058 1107 1108 1114 56 B AMC AKZ 2590 01-142-8249
1057 1057 1122 1123 1131 74 B AMC B17 1560 01-464-1953
1051 1052 1052 1052 1064 13 0 DLA S9C 2910 01-376-2266
0209 0209 0293 0293 0300 91 B DLA S9I 5315 00-017-9537
es us dates and information relative 
 requisition as follows: 
• docdate: Documen
requisitioner, taken from the first four digits subsequent to the DODAAC 
(Dept of Defense Activity Address Code) on the document number. 
•
acknowledged in the wholesale supply system. 
•
supply cut a materiel release order for the item(s). 
•
of the item to the requisitioner (through the CCP). 
•
consolidation and containerization point (CCP) received the shipment from 
the wholesale source of supply. 
•
Master Inventory Record Posting (MIRP) at the requisitioning SSA (i.e. D6S 
wholesale receipt date).  
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• ost: Order and Shipping Time- the number of days elapsed between docdate 
and mirp. 
 
• bkorder: Backorder- an identifier of whether the document went into 
backorder status or not, “B” in block indicates item is backordered. 
 
• sos: Source of Supply- a field indicating which source of supply fulfills the 
requirement. 
 
• niin:  the National Inventory Item Number of the item requisitioned.   
 
• matcat: Material Category- a five-digit alpha-numeric code, the last two 
placeholders indicating specifically what system the item supports or is an 
integral part thereof. 
 
  There is additional information and data housed within the LIF source 
data…however the above fields were considered sufficient to conduct the analysis within 
the intended scope of this thesis.  
 The LIF data was useful in answering the question: “Is their a difference in how 
long it takes a Defense Logistics Agency source of supply to cut the Materiel Release 
Order, ship the item, and get it to the East Coast Consolidation & Containerization Point 
(CCP) for Priority-02 (high priority) requisitions compared to how long it takes an Army 
Materiel Command source of supply to accomplish the same task?”   Here we focused on 
the mrodate-depship-ccpr elapsed time.  We did this for both DLA and AMC separately 
by dividing the requisitions up by source of supply.  
The LIF data was also quite useful in allowing us to address the question: “What 
portion of these requisitions can be linked directly to critical weapon systems and/or 
fleets?”  We conducted this analysis by breaking the source data down by matcat and 
performing our analysis of (1) percent backorder and (2) backorder time by system.  
2. LIF 
The LIF is a centralized database providing visibility of supply and transportation 
actions for requisitions placed on the wholesale system.  As materiel moves through the 
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pipeline to Army customers worldwide, automated supply and transportation systems 
feed the LIF current status on the location of the materiel.  The LIF provides quick 
reference to requisition status, shipping information, and receipt of materiel requisitioned. 
Finally, the LIF is the database used for reporting Army Velocity Management and Order 
Ship time performance.  As the data ages, it is transitioned into a historical database. 
3. Material Category Structure Code  
A Material Category (or MATCAT) Structure Code is a five-position 
alphanumeric code that details the materiel category structure detail for management of 
Army inventories.  For the purpose of this thesis, we are mostly concerned with the 4th 
and 5th positions in this code.  The fourth position codes are alphanumeric and for Army 
items, these codes identify special or specific groups of items.  The fifth position codes 
are alphanumeric as well and link the requested items to “parent” weapon systems or end 
items.  By combining these codes in positions 4 and 5, we are able to identify a specific 
weapon system/end item or homogeneous group of items. [Ref. 20]  
4. Uniform Materiel Movement and Issue Priority System  
Uniform Materiel Movement and Issue Priority System (UMMIPS) is a vital 
portion of the materiel requisitioning procedure in the military by setting the priorities for 
the issuance and movement of materiel based on input from the requesting activity.  The 
requestor must use a system designed to prioritize requests by importance of the activity 
and the Urgency of Need (UND).  Each requesting activity is assigned a Force/Activity 
Designator (F/AD) from 1 to 5 (highest to lowest) based on its level of importance, and 
an Urgency of Need Designator (UND) form 1 to 15 (Highest to lowest).  This thesis 
deals, in a large part, with the study of high priority requisitions originating from or 
through the eight divisional Supply Support Activities.  All such requisitions we analyzed 
have Priority Designators (PD) of 02, or Priority-02.  The priority designators are 
determined by the combination of the assigned Force/Activity Designator (F/AD) and the 





The units concerned in our study are all F/AD II units. 












I 01 04 11 
II 02 05 12 
III 03 06 13 
IV 07 09 14 
V 08 10 15 
 A = Unable to Perform Mission 
B = Impairing Mission 
C = Routine 
  
Table 3.   Priority Designator Matrix   
 
 As previously stated, all requisitions in our study were PD-02.  These requisitions 
had a UND of “A”, which translates to: immediate installation on, or repair of, mission 
essential materiel and without which the force is unable to perform assigned operational 
missions.  Stated in more common terms, UND of “A” usually results from a soldier 
utilizing the equipment technical manual and reading over to the “Not Mission Capable 
If…” column.  If the parts associated with the “Not Mission Capable” fault are not on-
hand, they are then considered UND “A” and result in ordering via a PD-02 requisition.  
Once ordered through the Logistics Automated System, the system/equipment is 
generally considered as Not Mission Capable-Supply (NMCS) until the necessary parts 
are receipted and maintenance work begins, whereupon the equipment enters into Not 
Mission Capable Maintenance (NMCM) status. [Ref. 21] 
 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter outlined the research methodology utilized during the conduct of this 
thesis.  It began by restating the objective of the study and the primary research 
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questions.  Next, more-detailed and specific measurement questions were generated and 
identified to narrow the research and give credence to the analysis and findings.  Then, 
the chapter covered the details of the data elements and how the information aided us in 




IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the analysis of the data using the methodology described in 
chapter III.   Again the research objectives of this thesis are restated for clarity.  
1. Research Objectives 
This research analyzes the effects of the SDMI program on two Army Divisions 
and their Class IX SSAs in EUCOM.  Our primary objective is to determine the effect 
SDMI has had on inventory levels and readiness.  In addition to addressing and 
answering the BOD’s questions, our alternative objectives include examination of 
barriers to improving velocity that still exist while focusing on lucrative targets that may 
impact readiness. 
B.  DATA ANALYSIS 
1.  ASL Lines (Breadth) and Depth (Inventory) 
Table 4 presents the findings for all eight SSAs from 1999-2002 and addresses the 
number (breadth) of lines stocked over time.  The table is broken down into two parts: (1) 
“All Sources of Supply” considers every single stocked NIIN regardless of its source of 
supply, and (2) “DLA-Specific” portion of the table addresses only those stocked NIINs 
that have a DLA source of supply.  The table indicates a tremendous increase in the 
number of lines stocked across all eight SSAs.  The DLA-specific items make up the 
lion’s share of increases across the board with the increases ranging from a low of 49% to 
a high of 467%, with an average increase of 98%. 
# Lines Feb 99 # Lines Oct 01 # Lines June 02 # Lines Feb 99 # Lines Oct 01 # Lines June 02 # INC %INC
AMX 47 FSB 555 2386 2283 335 1923 1899 1564 467%
ANF 501 FSB 978 2439 2539 671 2020 2082 1411 210%
WQR 123d MSB 2592 3131 3174 2054 2578 2608 554 27%
WQT 127 ASB 645 1398 1203 440 1078 974 534 121%
WQW 701 MSb 3312 3471 3620 2008 2910 2992 984 49%
WQ2 299 FSB 1291 2194 2439 958 1805 2008 1050 110%
WQZ 201 FSB 1451 2710 2829 1146 2386 2477 1331 116%
WQ4 601 ASB 504 806 869 355 673 719 364 103%
All SSAs 7967 15759 7792 98%
DLA SPECIFICALL SOURCES OF SUPPLY
 
Table 4.   Changes in Stockage Levels Over Time 
Table 5 presents the findings for all eight SSAs from 1999-2002 and addresses the 
depth of stocked lines over time.  The depth of an ASL item is a measure of how many 
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“eaches” of each line or NIIN is stocked at the SSA.  As the table indicates,  all eight 
SSAs experienced a significant increase in the depth of DLA items stocked in their ASLs, 
with the percentage increase of DLA items in the ASLs over the 1999-2002 time period 
ranging from a low of 13% to a high of 285%, and the net change across all Authorized 
Stockage Lists being a 69% increase in depth.  
 
Table 5.   Changes in Depth 
Table 6 supports and c L Depth.  Because Table 5 
is, in e
RIC SSA # EACHES 1999 # EACHES 2002 RAW CHANGE % CHANGE OVER PERIOD
AMX 47 FSB 2209 2833 624 28%
ANF 501 FSB 8120 13408 5288 65%
WQR 123 MSB 34593 38982 4389 13%
WQT 127 ASB 2712 5284 2572 95%
WQW 701 MSB 17360 28658 11298 65%
WQ2 299 FSB 14114 22907 8793 62%
WQZ 201 FSB 8940 34418 25478 285%
WQ4 601 ASB 1674 5026 3352 200%
TOTAL 89722 151516 61794 69%
DEPTH OF DLA ITEMS 1999-2002
*Must have been stocked in 1999 and 2002 to be considered for depth change
onfirms findings relative to AS
ssence, an “eaches” analysis, there is the possibility that a relatively small amount 
of lines that increased exponentially had a disproportional influence upon the findings.  
Table 6 therefore accentuates the findings in Table 5 by confirming that 64% of all ASL 
lines in the eight SSAs saw increases over the 1999-2002 period. 
RIC SSA PERCENT INCREASE PERCENT DECREASE PERCENT REMAINED CONSTANT
AMX 47 FSB 63% 20% 17%
ANF 501 FSB 65% 8% 27%
WQR 123 MSB 57% 31% 12%
WQT 127 ASB 56% 10% 34%
WQW 701 MSB 70% 19% 11%
WQ2 299 FSB 41% 35% 24%
WQZ 201 FSB 80% 8% 12%
WQ4 601 ASB 81% 12% 7%
TOTAL 64% 20% 16%
ASL LINES OVER 1999-2002 PERIOD
 
Table 6.   Analysis of Changes in all Lines  
The findings ve  ked “Are Strategic 
Distrib
ry directly answer the question the BOD as
ution improvements resulting in reduced inventories?” The answer is no, at least 
as far as these eight SSAs are concerned.  We have not seen inventory levels or depth 
reduced; in fact, we see the complete opposite.   One would expect that because SDMI 
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has focused on Time Definite Delivery over the past few years, leading to more 
“predictive delivery” in the supply chain process, that we should see a reduction in 
number and/or depth of ASL lines.  Customer confidence was supposed to rise, and lead 
to decreasing inventory levels. 
Contrary to the notion of the Army creating leaner inventories discussed in the 
two National Defense Magazine articles mentioned in Chapter 2 (references 14 and 15), 
the enormous increase in number of lines and the similar increase in the depth of lines 
have compounding negative effects.  As the number and depth of lines increase, we tend 
to see a growing “logistics footprint” which is contrary to what they are trying to achieve.   
With significant increases in the number and depth of ASL lines come additional 
requirements for storage facilities, more requirements set upon an already overburdened 
Stake and Platform (S&P) trailer fleet, more reliance on external support to transport the 
items across the battlefield and more burden placed upon materiel handling equipment.    
Most importantly, we see an increased workload upon soldiers and leaders managing the 
increased stock in their warehouses.   
Furthermore, along with the increased number and depth of lines, come increases 
in inventory holding costs, which include physical holding costs and opportunity costs.    
Physical holding costs includes extra storage space requirements (warehousing, shelving, 
materiel, bins, ISU-90s etc.) along with the cost of the additional items either becoming 
obsolete, pilfered, or lapsing into excess position and possibly losing these items during 
to the auto-excess process.  Potentially more significant than the holding cost is the 
opportunity cost; every dollar invested in inventory is money that cannot be spent 
elsewhere.  
Perhaps even more important is the opportunity cost as it relates to the soldier’s 
and leader’s time.  Do the additional lines and depth of stock warrant the extra man-hours 
involved in managing the extra stock?  With the increased lines and depth comes 
increased activity, more items (volume) to receipt, store, issue, and deliver.  Moreover, 
the SSA conducts 100% wall-to-wall inventories and other percentage inventories on a 
periodic basis.  The enormous increase in number and depth of lines results in additional 
burden during these periodic inventories.  Additionally, the opportunity cost of 
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performing these tasks related to increased number and depth of lines, is less time 
focusing on and managing processes that probably have higher value and return, such as 
managing repairable exchange, processing high priority requisitions, and managing 
referrals. 
2.  Inventory Turbulence 
To restate our conservative definition of turbulence, we analyzed items that were 
stocked in February 1999, subsequently dropped by October 2001, and then these very 
same items had been picked back up (re-stocked) in the ASLs by June 2002.   We found a 
very large number of items that met this conservative definition of turbulence.   
Table 7 shows the percent of total lines experiencing turbulence.  We see that 
6.1% of the ASL lines across the eight SSAs experienced turbulence.  Table 8 shows the 
percent of total “Eaches” experiencing turbulence.  We see from this table that nearly 
12% of the total “Eaches” experienced turbulence.  The monetary costs associated with 
deleting the 691 lines (and 10,680 Eaches) from the eight SSAs and subsequently re-
adding them was $3.9 Million.  This figure is based on the Requisition Objective 
quantity.  In an attempt to be more conservative, it is better to base the monetary 
calculation using On-Hand (OH) quantities, since the SSAs are rarely at 100% of the 
Requisition Objective.     Using February 1999 on-hand quantities for the lines concerned 
as a basis, the SSAs more realistically experienced monetary losses of $3.3 Million.  We 
want to emphasize at this point that these figures, in terms of ASL turbulence and 
associated monetary costs, are very conservative.  A study of turbulence using the more 
traditional definition would have included an analysis of decreases and increases to stock 
over time and considered the overall “churn” of the ASL.      
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SSA # LINES EXPERIENCING TURBULENCE*











*Based on a narrow definition of Turbulence--meaning these lines were deleted from ASLs and subsequently re-added. A study of Turbulence in its 
broader definition would have included decreases and increases to stock over time.  
 
Table 7.   Number of Lines Experiencing Turbulence 
 
 
SSA # EACHES EXPERIENCING TURBULENCE*











*Based on a narrow definition of Turbulence--meaning the "Eaches" associated with these Lines were deleted from ASLs and subsequently re-added. 
A study of Turbulence in its broader definition would have included decreases and increases to stock over time.   
Table 8.   Number of Eaches Experiencing Turbulence 
 
Even with the strict monetary arguments aside, the effects of the inventory 
turbulence are profound.  Looking at Table 7 again, we see that 691 lines (stocked NIINs) 
are involved.  Relative to the lines, Table 8 shows that 10,680 eaches (i.e. eaches, 
assemblies, packages, boxes) were involved.  These items had to be picked, processed 
and packed by SSA personnel, while some of them even required materiel handling 
equipment (MHE) use.  These items had to be uploaded onto trucks heading to the 
Theater Central Retention Account (CRA) for serviceable excess Class IX materiel.   
After being transported to the CRA the items had to be received, documented and stored.    
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As discussed in Chapter II, many of these items ultimately end up being transferred to 
DRMO or being retrograded back to CONUS.    
What’s important to point out here is that after all of this effort to purge these 
items from the SSAs, the items were re-added to the SSAs Authorized Stockage Lists the 
very next year.  As discussed earlier, the SSAs bought them back at full Army Master 
Data File (AMDF) price.  Thus the monetary impact is that the individual SSA must re-
purchase these items.  But in addition to that, there is plane, ship, truck, and MHE 
capacity being used up in order to re-position the assets to their original SSA stockage 
point.  Quite literally, an asset could have been shipped in 1999 to an SSA and been put 
in stock, deleted between 2000 and 2001, sent down to the Theater CRA, and ultimately 
retrograded back to CONUS, put back in wholesale stock, re-added to the SSA ASL in 
2002, consequently reordered, and made a trip across the Atlantic a third time to be put 
back into SSA stock.   Finally, the SSA would have paid for the same item twice.         
One perspective of considering the effects of this inventory turbulence is in terms 
of an economic outlook introduced by Frederic Bastiat, which he calls: “What is Seen and 
What Is Not Seen.”  In introducing his essay, he states, “an act…produces not only one 
effect, but a series of effects.  Of these effects, the first alone is immediate; it appears 
simultaneously with its cause; it is seen.  The other effects emerge only subsequently; 
they are not seen.” [Ref. 22] 
Like Bastiat’s mantra, the “act” in our case is the deletion of items from the ASL 
and then re-adding them in the subsequent year(s).  Its effect can be seen by looking at an 
ASL listing, the items are no longer there when deleted and are there when re-added.  
What are all-too-often given little consideration are the effects of “what is not seen.”  As  
discussed above, the act of deleting items from the ASL creates a series of effects, or the 
“what is not seen” such as: soldiers pulling, packing, and shipping the materiel, loading 
trucks, hauling cargo, receiving and storing, redistributing, in some cases retrograding 
back to CONUS, etc. 
42 
Some might argue that this is what we pay soldiers to do…or this is good training 
and use of trucks, but such reasoning reminds us of Bastiat’s “Broken Window Fallacy.” 1 
It is not seen that, since the warehouse soldiers are performing activities relative to the 
turbulence, they will not be able to spend time on other activities that have higher value.  
Such reasoning also can be made about truck capacity, manager’s time, use of storage 
space in the local warehouse and at the excess warehouse, etc.   
Furthermore, this line of reasoning parallels the idea of opportunity cost and 
dealing with scarcity.  All kinds of decisions involve opportunity costs, not just ones 
about how to best spend money.  Time is another scarce resource for the soldier’s who 
work at an SSA.  At any given time, some of the SSA workforce is deployed, training, at 
an appointment, sick or in their quarters, away at school, or on maternity leave, resulting 
in scarce personnel resources.  Likewise, material-handling equipment (MHE-i.e. forklift) 
trained and licensed operators, trucks, and storage space are limited resources.  The 
combined effects of all of these factors lead to the opportunity costs and the effects of 
what is not seen and are rather profound in terms of managing and dealing with inventory 
turbulence.       
3.  SD Impact Upon Readiness 
We analyzed the readiness of the fleets using historical monthly readiness data for 
the period from 1999-2002 provided by LOGSA.   
Observation of the mean readiness levels, before and after the implementation of 
SDMI, indicated differences between Infantry and Armored Divisions, and between 
weapon systems.  That is, it appeared that SDMI may have affected different weapon 
systems differently (sometimes it went up, and sometimes it went down).  Consequently, 
a 2 X 2 X 6 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted to examine the changes in 
readiness levels across three factors:  
                                                 
1 In Bastiat’s broken-window fallacy, someone breaks a window. It’s unfortunate, but there is a silver 
lining. Money spent to repair the window will bring new business to the repairman. He, in turn, will spend 
his higher income and generate more business for others. The broken window could ultimately create a 
boom. But, wait a minute, Bastiat cautions. That’s based only on what is seen. You must also consider what 
is not seen. What is not seen is how the money would have been spent if the window had not been broken. 
The broken window didn’t increase spending…it diverted spending. 
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(1) Pre and post SDMI (two levels), 
(2) Infantry and Armor Division (two levels), and  
(3) Weapon System (six levels) 
An ANOVA indicates a statistically significant three-way interaction in readiness 
between the period prior to the implementation of SDMI in Europe (Dec 99 – Mar 01, 
SDMI-E) and the period when SDMI was in effect Apr 01 – Jul 02, based on the division 
and weapon system (F=3.568;df=5,23;p=.004).  This essentially says that to understand 
the impact of SDMI on readiness, you need to look at individual weapons systems, and 
divisions separately.  Readiness sometimes increased (e.g. the mean readiness for M939 
Bobtails increased from 93.03 during the Pre-SDMI-E period to a mean readiness of 
93.44 in the SDMI-E period, an increase of .41 of a percent).  But, in some cases, it 
decreased (e.g. the mean readiness for MLRSs decreased from 97.031 during the Pre-
SDMI-E period to a mean readiness of 94.562 in the SDMI-E period, a decrease of 2.47 
percent).  However, as shown in Table 9, Cell Means Tests show that in no case did 
readiness show a statistically significant improvement in an individual weapon system 
when comparing the Pre-SDMI-E period to the SDMI-E period. [Ref. 23]  
Pre-SDMI SDMI t-value* Pre-SDMI SDMI t-value* Pre-SDMI SDMI t-value*
Mean 93.06 92.69 91 90.38 92.03 91.53
Std Dev 2.08 2.55 6.7 3.32 4.99 3.14
Mean 95 94.19 91.06 92.69 93.03 93.44
Std Dev 1.26 2.2 3.34 1.74 3.19 2.09
Mean 91.69 94.31 90.38 88.94 91.03 91.63
Std Dev 1.45 1.7 2.36 3.04 2.04 3.65
Mean 97 95.56 96.06 94.69 96.53 95.12
Std Dev 1.21 1.26 1.65 2.47 1.5 1.98
Mean 94.63 93.56 91.94 94.56 94.03 93.66
Std Dev 1.82 3.01 1.69 2.48 2.2 2.76
Mean 98.63 97.06 95.44 92.06 97.03 94.56



















*Measured against a critical t (tukey) of 2.998. The test was a one-sided t-test using an alpha of 0.05. None of the t-
values exceed the critical t , we therefore conclude that there is no evidence that Strategic Distribution Initiatives have 










Table 9.   Cell Means Test Results 
 
We can therefore conclude that there is no evidence that SDMI-E has increased 
readiness in the two Divisions (F=2.056; df=1, 23; p=.152).    
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In further support of the findings above are the exponentially smoothed time 
series for the fleets.  While essentially a qualitative analysis, this technique was chosen 
because it allowed us to smooth a time series, and thereby provided us with an impression 
as to the overall long-term movement in the data.  Exponentially smoothed time series for 
the M1, M2, and M113 fleets are depicted in figures 3 through 5.  The exponentially 
smoothed time series was run over a 31 month time period, which began in January 2000, 
and ran through July 2002.  January 2000 was selected as the start because nearly all 
metrics associated with gauging SDMI performance use CY2000 as a baseline/base-year, 
and January 2000 is the beginning of that base year.  The “Alpha” used in each 
exponentially smoothed time series was determined by obtaining the linear optimization 
solution through minimization of the Mean Squared Error (MSE).  Looking at figures 3 
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Figure 5.   Exponentially Smoothed Time Series-M113 Armored Personnel Carrier 
 
Again, based on both the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), and the Exponentially 
Smoothed Time Series figures, we conclude that there is no evidence that Strategic 




4.  Comparison of DLA and AMC MRO-DEPSHP-CCPR Time  
To begin with, we studied all Priority-02 requisitions in FY01 ordered through/by 
the eight SSAs, which were ultimately entered into the DAAS system and were routed to 
a wholesale source of supply.  Using this source data, we measured OST for high priority 
requisitions, analyzing AMC and DLA separately.  In this analysis, we considered OST 
without backorders (refer to section B, part 4 of Chapter III for OST definitions).  
The mean OST times are 12.1 days for AMC and 10.3 days for DLA, a difference 
of 1.8 days.  A two-sample t-test shows this difference to be statistically significant 
(p<0.00001).  Figures 6 and 7 show the difference by comparing the probability and 
cumulative distributions.  Furthermore, the difference is confirmed by comparing 
percentiles (Table 10), which show that the AMC distribution is consistently 1 or more 
days longer than its DLA counterpart.     
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Figure 6.   Probability Distribution-OST 
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Figure 7.   Cumulative Distribution-OST   
 
Percentile DLA AMC 
50th 9 day 10 days
75th 12 days 13 days
95th 17 days 21 days
OST W/O BACKORDERS TIME
 
Table 10.   OST without Backorder Time for Pri-02 Requisitions 
 
Analysis shows that a significant portion of the OST time difference is 
attributable to MRO-CCPR time.  The mean times for MRO-CCPR times are 2.9 days for 
AMC and 2.2 days for DLA, a difference of .7 days.  A two-sample t-test for unequal 
means shows this difference to be statistically significant (p<0.00001).  The source of the 
difference can be seen by comparing the probability and cumulative distributions shown 
in figures 8 and 9 below.  Comparisons at the 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles (see Table 
11) confirm what is evident from the distributions: that AMC’s MRO-CCPR time is one 

























Figure 8.   Probability Distribution-MRO-CCPR 
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Figure 9.   Cumulative Distribution-MRO-CCPR 
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Percentile DLA AMC 
50th 1 day 2 days
75th 3 days 4 days
95th 6 days 7 days
MRO-CCPR TIME
 
Table 11.   MRO-CCPR Time for Pri-02 Requisitions 
 
As we have seen already, OST for high-priority requisitions without backorder for 
AMC is 1.8 days longer on average.  Analysis of this data shows that the majority of the 
difference in OST is in the MRO-CCPR time.   
The 1-day difference is split almost exactly evenly between MRO to Shipment 
time and Shipment to CCP Receipt time.  In other words, it takes AMC sources of supply 
about ½ day longer to accomplish each of these tasks.  This 1-day difference, on average, 
again is for high priority requisitions that are rendering equipment Non-Mission Capable.    
When one looks at fleet readiness, one sees fleets barely missing their 90% goals 
consistently by small margins (i.e. 89%, 88%, 87%).  From our experiences, there are 
numerous fleets that bust this readiness threshold because of 1-day or a few days of a 
system being non-mission capable.  This 1-day becomes even more significant when it 
affects a low-density fleet such as having only 18 MLRS per division.  In cases where 
such fleets are concerned, every single day makes a difference.  This is the case because 
such fleets have a smaller denominator of the readiness equation.   
5.  Source of Supply, Percent Backorder, and Backorder Time Analysis 
Table 12 presents findings by system, and suggests that for all systems considered 
in our study, the ratio of high priority items supported by AMC was significantly greater 
than DLA.  For example, considering M1 Tanks, AMC supported 3.5 times as many high 
priority requisitions compared to DLA.  These are for high priority requisitions that can 
be directly linked to the M1 Weapon System by its MATCAT indicator.  Again, these are 
PRI 02 requisitions that are rendering equipment Non-Mission Capable.  Looking across 
all seven systems included in our study, AMC supports 2.7 times more high priority 
requisitions compared to DLA.   
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DLA % AMC % RATIO OF HI-PRI ITEMS SUPPORTED AMC : DLA
M1 Tank 22% 78% 3.5 : 1
M2 IFV 29% 71% 2.4 : 1
AH-64 43% 57% 1.3 : 1
M113 FOV 40% 60% 1.5 : 1
HEMTT 39% 61% 1.6 : 1
M939 FOV 21% 79% 3.8 : 1




27% 73% 2.7 : 1
 
Table 12.   Ratio of PRI-02 Items Provided by AMC vs. DLA 
 
It is clear then, that if the desired goal of SD is to focus on and improve 
readiness…then, as much if not more, time and resources must be spent analyzing, 
optimizing, and removing barriers to velocity where AMC items are concerned.      
Nevertheless, both DLA and AMC support high priority requisitions specifically 
tied to weapon systems.  One of the tenets of the SDMI Project Management Plan is to 
knock down barriers to improving velocity [Ref. 4].  A major barrier to improving 
velocity and, hence Customer Wait Time, is the percent of high priority requisitions 
going into backorder; and once in backorder, the amount of time these requisitions spend 
in backorder status.  These requisitions have direct links to readiness since they affect the 





As the backorder days lengthen…available days become “smaller”, thus reducing 





M1 Tank 17% 18%
IFV 14% 50%
HEMTT 52% 19%
M113 FOV 11% 52%
M939 FOV 40% 50%
MLRS 78% 18%




Table 13.   Percent of High Priority Requisitions Going Into Backorder Status 
 
Table 13 above represents the percent of high priority requisitions going into 
backorder by system; simply considering the backorder percentages, one can easily 
surmise that herein lies a “lucrative target.”  It is clear that when we see backorder 
percentages as high as 63%, 52%, and 40% for high priority requisitions that these rates 
are directly affecting readiness of the fleets. 
Tables 14 through 20 display the mean backorder time (in days) by system and 
source of supply, and also display the aggregate means.  Additionally, it is useful to 
consider the backorder time at the 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles.  These tables 
complement Table 13 by building upon, representing, and providing further details of the 
percentage of requisitions that “do go into backorder.” 
AMC DLA AGGREGATE
Mean 51 83 58
50th (Median) 21 35 26
75th 56 119 66
95th 251 343 258
Percentile
M1 BACKORDER TIME (DAYS)
*PRI 02 Requisitions only and by MATCAT  




Mean 56 55 56
50th (Median) 21 60 21
75th 64 71 66
95th 255 254 255
AH-64 BACKORDER TIME (DAYS)
Percentile
*PRI 02 Requisitions only and by MATCAT  
Table 15.   AH-64 Backorder Time 
 
AMC DLA AGGREGATE
Mean 12 50 32
50th (Median) 6 27 14
75th 14 86 40
95th 93 181 156
HEMTT BACKORDER TIME (DAYS)
Percentile
*PRI 02 Requisitions only and by MATCAT  
Table 16.   HEMTT Backorder Time 
AMC DLA AGGREGATE
Mean 28 83 35
50th (Median) 7 86 10.5
75th 32 119 41
95th 192 216 209
M113 BACKORDER TIME (DAYS)
Percentile
*PRI 02 Requisitions only and by MATCAT  
Table 17.   M113 Backorder Time 
 
AMC DLA AGGREGATE
Mean 65 152 80
50th (Median) 21.5 76.5 23
75th 79 300 105
95th 301 335 330
M939 BACKORDER TIME (DAYS)
Percentile
*PRI 02 Requisitions only and by MATCAT  




Mean 19 97 58
50th (Median) 8 40 24.5
75th 23 209 48
95th 85 305 305
MLRS BACKORDER TIME (DAYS)
Percentile
*PRI 02 Requisitions only and by MATCAT  
Table 19.   MLRS Backorder Time 
 
AMC DLA AGGREGATE
Mean 64 66 65
50th (Median) 26 40 26
75th 84 84 84
95th 316 232 308
Percentile
IFV BACKORDER TIME (DAYS)
*PRI 02 Requisitions only and by MATCAT  
Table 20.   IFV Backorder Time 
 
The SDMI Project Management Plan’s Data Collection and Measurement Plan 
refers to backorder rates as a quality metric [Ref. 4].  To build upon that, since backorder 
rates gives birth to backorder ‘days’, which ultimately affect customer wait time, we have 
a time metric at work as well.  Since the two metrics are interrelated, and because the 
backorder percentages and backorder days are so profound and are directly linked to 
readiness, SD would likely gain by pursuing this “lucrative target.”  
Furthermore, if several high priority requisitions are submitted for a Non-Mission 
Capable piece of equipment, it is most likely that a backordered item is one that is going 
to determine when the system comes back online.  Looking at many of weapon systems 
in our study, the typical (median) backorder ranges between 21-26 days, which means 
that the backorder time alone is eating away at readiness significantly in at least one 
month, and if the backorder span is across two report periods, then can potentially even 
affect two different reported months.  
Re-considering the data in Table 13 and Tables 14-20, one has to wonder how the 
fleets make their readiness goals as often as they do.  We know in some months, these 
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fleets just do not achieve the readiness goal.  In our opinion, the frequency of failing 
fleets would be much greater if it wasn’t for workarounds such as controlled substitution, 
controlled exchange, “scrounging”2, and effective use of the local Cannibalization Point. 
Controlled substitution is when serviceable components from unserviceable and 
economically un-repairable items are removed for immediate reuse to restore a similar 
item or weapons system to fully mission capable status.  In cases of Controlled Exchange, 
the commander authorizes exchange when a valid requisition is submitted to replace the 
unserviceable item and when the required components are not available before the 
required delivery date.  Cannibalization, from the Army’s perspective is defined as the 
authorized removal of components from equipment designated for disposal and has been 
“stricken” from the fleet.  Other factors that help fleets jump the readiness hurdle include 
effective use of Operational Readiness Float (ORF)3 and astute management of NMCM 
time.  
As stated earlier, the backorder rates and time associated with these systems have 
a direct negative affect on readiness.  However, the backorder rates and time have “costs” 
other than readiness.  An Air Force Magazine article titled What About Army Aviation? 
[Ref. 24] states Army sources claim that the “apparent healthy state of frontline aviation 
forces is at least partly illusion.  Widespread use of “controlled substitution” is masking a 
deep and serious readiness problem that must be addressed.”  Similarly, a GAO report 
titled Parts Shortages Are Impacting Operations and Maintenance Effectiveness 
concluded that “parts shortages created inefficiencies in maintenance processes and 
procedures that have lowered morale of maintenance personnel.” Additionally, it stated, 
“to compensate for the lack of spare parts, maintenance personnel use [controlled] 
substitution of parts.”  The study concluded that the principal reason for workarounds 
such as controlled substitution is the non-availability of serviceable repair parts.  [Ref. 
25]  
                                                 
2 Scrounging is slang used commonly among supply and maintenance personnel and is used to refer to 
resorting to the “good ‘ole boy” network.  Tactics include calling other motor pools, canvassing friends and 
colleagues for required parts, making spare part “trades” or “quid pro quo” deals, etc.    
 3ORF is a quantity of selected end items or major components of equipment authorized for stockage at 
CONUS installations and overseas support maintenance activities, which extends their capability to 
respond to materiel readiness requirements of supported activities.  It is accomplished by providing 
supported activities with serviceable replacements from ORF assets when their like items of equipment 
cannot be repaired or modified in time to meet operational requirements. 
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Although units do rely on controlled substitution to overcome the non-availability 
of parts, the practice does not resolve spare parts shortages4.  Furthermore, while the use 
of controlled exchange may keep specific critical equipment mission capable, it is not an 
efficient practice.  This practice requires at least twice the maintenance time of normal 
repairs because it involves removing and installing components from two pieces of 
equipment instead of one, as Figure 10 depicts.  Moreover, when a mechanic removes a 
part from a piece of equipment to place on another piece of equipment, the risk of 
damaging the weapon system and/or the “good part” in the process is magnified.  The 
GAO report also suggested that controlled substitutions “have negatively affected morale 
because they are sometimes seen as routinely making unrealistic demands on 
maintenance personnel.”  The report also echoes a statement made by the Army 
DCSLOG5 that, “the added workload degrades maintenance soldiers’ morale.”  In August 
1999, GAO also reported that the majority of factors cited by personnel as sources of 
dissatisfaction and reasons for leaving the military were work-related circumstances such 
as the lack of parts and materials to successfully complete daily job requirements.6 
                                                 
 4Aviation Logistics Study 99: Controlled Substitution Study, Jan 7, 2000.  The Army study further 
states that the three primary reasons for the practice of controlled substitution are to (1) keep operational 
rates up (2) circumvent log lead times for requisitioned parts, and (3) have parts available when funds are 
limited at the end of the fiscal year.   
 5Statement made by Lieutenant General Charles S.  Mahan, Jr.  Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, 
U.S.  Army, to the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, 
House Committee on Government Reform, May 22, 2001.   
 6Military Personnel: Perspectives of Surveyed Service Members in Retention Critical Specialties 
(GAO/NSIAD-99-197BR, August 16, 1999) 
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Controlled Substitution
Figure 10.   Repair vs. Controlled Substitution  
Another topic not covered in this thesis but equally important concerns the 
problems that arise from controlled substitution in terms of reliability.  When a part is 
subjected to controlled substitution, effectively a “used” part, one that has not been 
reconditioned is installed.  Once this is done, the reliability of that part and essentially the 
weapon system has been compromised as the expected reliability of that part is reduced.  
This point supports the notion that controlled substitution is merely a short-term fix and 
not a solution. 
Effective NMCM time is yet another area that contributes to the “masking” of the 
parts shortages problem.  Like instances of controlled substitution, once the repair parts 
do arrive, the repair process (actual maintenance) may need to be quickly performed at 
any time, day or night, to meet operational commitments or readiness goals.  In such 
cases, the maintenance personnel must continue working until the job is done.  The 
maintenance teams often “surge” to meet goals and requirements.  In many cases, the 
supply system delivers repair parts on a Friday, and with fleets edging around the 
readiness goals, they can ill afford the additional two or three days of downtime the 
weekend would bring.  Therefore, maintenance personnel end up working jobs late into 
the evening on Friday in such cases or over the weekend in order to help “save” a fleet.  
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The wholesale backorder rate and time can be a significant factor leading to this 
predicament.   
Still another workaround is use of the local cannibalization point.  Many of the 
same drawbacks relevant to controlled substitution are applicable here.  Mainly, that 
additional maintenance time is involved in pulling the part required from the cannibalized 
system and installing it on the downed equipment.  Additionally, there is also a good deal 
of administrative time involved in using the cannibalization point.  Leadership has to 
scrub the Cannibalization Point listings, drive to the Cannibalization Point, see if there 
are any relative serviceable parts, if so…then remove them and drive back to the motor 
pool to install, in hopes that it will function properly on the downed equipment.  In cases 
where the Motor Sergeant or Maintenance Foreman are performing such tasks, the 
opportunity cost of doing this is less time supervising scheduled unit maintenance and 
managing critical maintenance tasks for the unit (services, motor stables, etc.) 
In summary, the magnitude of backorder rates for these weapons systems and 
their respective backorder time have costs in terms of readiness of the fleets.  Moreover, 
there are “costs” associated with the high backorder rates and time other than readiness, 
including increased maintenance time, degraded maintenance soldiers’ morale, increased 
administrative time, and increased demands on maintenance leadership time which is 
already at full capacity.  Therefore, to restate the opening postulate, SDMI has much to 
gain by pursuing this “lucrative target.”  
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the results of the data analysis using the methodology 
described in Chapter III.  It provided a detailed analysis for each of the research areas 
covered by the primary research questions as well as the measurement questions.   





V. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an overview of the research conducted in the course of 
compiling our Thesis. It draws on the analysis contained in the previous chapter to 
develop conclusions about SDMI and its affect upon Inventory Levels and Readiness. It 
then provides recommendations based on the authors research and concludes with 
recommendations for future research.  
We would like to begin by stating that we believe that Strategic Distribution is a 
good program that has achieved significant success.  We believe that improvements are 
being made in the performance of the DoD supply chain as a result of Strategic 
Distribution.  Though outside the scope of our research, we have every reason to believe 
that published achievements of SDMI have merit.  For example, in an article titled 
Strategic Distribution: Transformation Now, it stated “Customer Wait Time had been 
reduced from a pre-SD average of 15 days to 11 days for European Command units.”  
The article further asserted that “for sea deliveries to European military customers, 
customer wait time has been reduced, on the average from over 55 days to less than 40 
days…a 27 percent reduction” and that “A customer wait time reduction of one day 
equates to about $4 million savings to U.S. taxpayers.”  These are remarkable 
accomplishments and are fully in keeping with the original SDMI goals and objectives. 
[Ref. 26] 
 The successes of SDMI stand by themselves and give credence to the program. 
Nevertheless, neither the anticipated decreases in inventory levels nor the increases in 
fleet readiness have yet been realized.  Simply reducing customer wait time may not 
markedly impact readiness.  Getting mud flaps, camouflage nets, copying paper, seat 
cushions, etc. to the customer faster is not going to affect readiness.  It is good that such 
items are moving faster and processes are being optimized that save money. However, if 
we hope to impact readiness through supply and distribution, then we must focus on 
improving customer wait time for readiness type items and items that are linked directly 
to our combat fleets.  
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 B.  CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
1. Conclusions 
a.  The Expected Reductions in Inventory Levels Were Not Realized 
Following the Implementation of SDMI in Europe. 
Not only did we not see inventory levels reduced, we actually saw a 
marked increase in inventory levels across the eight supply support activities.  For DLA-
specific ASL Lines, there was an average increase of 98%. Relative to the number of 
ASL lines, the depth of the DLA items in the ASLs saw an average increase of 69%.      
 
b.  Inventory Turbulence is Using Up Scarce Resources and Offers 
an Opportunity for Improvement as a Lucrative Target in Terms 
of Potential Savings in Time, Cost and Quality. 
Inventory turbulence in the Supply Support Activities is problematic and 
sub-optimized.  The effects of the turbulence use up scarce resources available to each 
SSA, such as time, manpower, materiel handling equipment, processing capacity, trucks, 
etc.  Moreover, the practice (intended or unintended) of deleting ASL lines and 
subsequently re-adding them attaches to itself the appearance of capriciousness and a lack 
of constancy.  We are unable to determine whether the turbulence, as described here and 
in chapters 2-4, is a matter of oversight or an intentional development.  We suspect that it 
is largely, if not completely, unintentional and is caused by factors such as yearly 
Demand Analysis, changing stockage criteria, and/or implementing new ASL models.  
Regardless of whether it is intentional or unintentional, inventory turbulence results in 
significant monetary and opportunity costs.    
 
c.  There is No Evidence That SDMI has Increased Fleet Readiness. 
Based on the historical monthly readiness data we obtained from LOGSA, 
and the analysis we conducted in chapter IV using Exponential Smoothing and Analysis 
of Variance techniques, we conclude that there is no evidence that SDMI has increased 
fleet readiness in the two divisions.  
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d. The Defense Logistics Agency Moves High-Priority Items to the 
Consolidation and Containerization Point Consistently 1 Day 
Faster Than the Army Materiel Command, Which Ultimately 
Translates Into Getting the High-Priority Items to the Customer 
Faster (OST One or More Days Faster for Items Coming from 
DLA Sources). 
Many will say that this is a comparison of apples and oranges.  DLA deals 
mainly in consumables, while AMC deals with reparables and major assemblies.  
Although this is a logical line of reasoning, one should not leave it at that.  Considering 
the SDMI methodology to Define, Measure, and Improve (D-M-I), we attempted to 
Define and Measure this segment of requisition cycle time in the context of a comparison 
of two strategic suppliers to the Army.  The third phase (Improve) is addressed in the 
Recommendations section that follows. Since AMC supports nearly 3 times as many high 
priority type items as DLA, it is desirable that AMC pick and move those high priority 
items to the CCP at least as quickly, if not more swiftly, than DLA.  Whether this is 
feasible or not is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
e.  Backorder Rates and Associated Time Spent in Backorder Status 
for High-Priority Requisitions are Lucrative Targets for Both 
AMC & DLA.   
The rate of high priority items going into backorder is high.  The related 
days spent in backorder are also very high.  Coupled together, these two factors 
negatively impact the readiness of fleets.  Besides the negative affect upon fleet 
readiness, the parts shortages also lead to undesirable “workarounds” such as controlled 
substitution and cannibalization which, when looked at in detail, are inefficient practices.  
Essentially, backorder rates and backorder times are huge barriers to velocity.  
2. Recommendations 
a.   Collaborate on and Establish an Integrated Vision of SDMI and 
its Intended Effect Upon Inventories. The Streamlined “Vision” 
and its Associated Goals Must Have “Buy-in” at the Strategic, 
Operational, and Tactical Levels of Decisionmaking.  
Through SDMI’s focus on Time Definite Delivery, leading to more 
“predictive delivery” in the supply chain process, there was an expectation that the 
number and/or depth of ASL lines would be reduced.  Customer confidence was 
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supposed to rise, and lead to decreasing inventory levels.  This was the vision at the 
“Strategic” level.  However, at the operational and tactical levels, the logic and reasoning 
behind inventory decisions appear to have had a different focus.  
The multiple levels of planning and decisionmaking must be in concert 
with each other.  The same outcomes and expectations must be shared throughout the 
supply chain.  Likewise, there must be “buy-in” on the published goals and objectives all 
the way down the supply chain.  The vision must be strategically, operationally, and 
tactically streamlined.  
We must work towards the Joint Vision 2020 goal of reducing the logistics 
footprint [Ref. 6].  The focus must be on stocking items that directly contribute to 
readiness (oftentimes referred to as readiness drivers).  Authorized Stockage List (ASL) 
accommodation shouldn’t take a prominent position as a primary metric; that is, the goal 
should not be to try and accommodate every possible customer requirement.  Examples 
such as mud flaps, seat cushions, fenders, camouflage nets, etc, add very little, if any, real 
value to an ASL.  These type items belong in strategic depots and warehouses that DLA 
and AMC run.  The metric of customer wait time and concept of time definite delivery 
should continue to be optimized so that we can get these items faster and more 
predictably.  Why?…because we don’t want to have to stock them and drag them across 
the battlefield.  Stock readiness drivers in the ASL, let improvements in Customer Wait 
Time and Time Definite Delivery take care of the rest.  
 
b.  Coupled with the Recommendation Above, Decide Upon a 
Stockage Model and “Stick With it”. Enforce the Model’s use 
and Build-in Effective Turbulence Screening Tools Into the 
Model.  
We say “coupled with the recommendation above” because an integrated 
and streamlined vision must be agreed upon as a natural first step.  A particular stockage 
model should be decided upon for a given division and the model should be kept in use as 
a chosen “model”.  This is not to say that 10 years later we shouldn’t migrate to a more 
proven model available in the future.  The fundamental thesis is that we should not 
change stockage models from year to year (e.g. Demand Analysis in 2000, EOQ in 2001, 
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Dollar Cost Banding in 2002, etc.).  However, this probably only explains some of the 
turbulence as described in this thesis.  A portion of turbulence may still remain within 
any given stockage determination model.  Therefore, the second part of our 
recommendation is to build screening tools into the model if they don’t already exist.  For 
example, the model could “flag” ASL lines as deletions during last years’ ASL 
Review…which would prompt a manager hopefully to question “why are we considering 
re-adding this line again?” or similarly, the model could “flag” ASL Lines as additions 
during last years’ ASL Review…which would likewise prompt a manager hopefully to 
question, “Why are we considering deleting this line…we just added it last year?”      
 
c.  In Order to Realize Noticeable Increases in Readiness, 
Aggressively Pursue The Reduction of Backorder Rates and 
Associated Time Spent in Backorder for High-Priority Type 
Items. 
We believe that this area is one of the most significant barriers to 
improving velocity.  Since these items are directly linked to readiness, and can be traced 
directly in support of particular fleets, this is an especially lucrative target to pursue.  
Moreover, because these metrics (backorder rate and time) have a direct link to the 
readiness equation, Available Days/Possible Days, attacking this problem has one of the 
greatest potential savings in terms of time.  This in turn, will “save or sustain” the above 
Available Days numerator, leading to increasing readiness rates.  Still more, targeting this 
area for aggressive improvement will also create very desirable side effects.  Finally, 
attacking the “parts shortage” problem will help reduce the necessity to rely upon 
undesirable “workarounds” such as controlled substitution, cannibalization, and 
scrounging…all inefficient practices.  
    
d.  Army Materiel Command Should be an Active, Participating 
Member of the Strategic Distribution Team. Likewise, the 
Strategic Distribution Team Should Embrace the Army Materiel 
Command as a Vital Member Of the Team.   
Nowhere in the course of our intensive research and development of our 
thesis did we find evidence that Army Materiel Command was included as a critical team 
member.  No Army Materiel Command representatives could be found under any of the 
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“member” or “contact” listings (e.g. not represented as a Core Team Member or on any 
of the “Committees”).  Additionally, we could find no evidence that Army Materiel 
Command attended, played a role in, or contributed to quarterly Board of Directors 
meetings or recurring In-Progress-Review meetings.  As discussed in Chapter IV, Army 
Materiel Command supports nearly 3 times the amount of high-priority type requisitions 
that are linked directly to weapon systems readiness.  It is clear then, that if we want to 
influence processes and items that lead to improvements in readiness, and craft 
improvements to the supply chain that make a difference in the field, that Army Materiel 
Command must play a significant role.  We therefore recommend that Army Materiel 
Command, as a vital member of the integrated supply chain, take an active role and be 
provided full membership on the Strategic Distribution Team.  
 
e.  Apply Lessons Learned and SDMI “Tenets” to the Army 
Materiel Command Piece of the Supply Chain. Seek 
Optimization of Army Materiel Command MRO-CCPR Time as 
an Initial Lucrative Target.  
In the end…both DLA and AMC are moving “stuff.” A root cause 
analysis should be conducted to identify any potential improvements for this important 
segment of requisition cycle time.  In the course of the analysis, one should seek to 
incorporate the lessons learned from DLA and the implementation of SDMI over the past 
several years.  Lessons learned in the areas of picking parts, optimizing the scheduling of 
trucks, and reducing variability by focusing on Time-Definite-Delivery may facilitate this 
process and help realize important improvements to the supply chain distribution 
network. 
3. Limitations 
In order to make the conclusions above, there are a number of limitations that 
must be considered.  Our analyses were either based on cross-sectional data, or were 
before-after comparisons made without control variables, so it is impossible to address 
the issue of causation.  For example, while we found no increase in readiness associated 
directly with SDMI, we cannot say that SDMI had no impact on readiness: it may be that 
but- for SDMI, readiness levels would have gone down.  However, it is plausible to say 
that the anticipated increase in readiness due to SDMI was not realized.   
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As discussed in Chapter II, there are many causal factors that changes inventory 
levels at the SSA; SDMI is but one of them.  Because we could not control for all of 
those other factors, it is not possible to draw a direct link between SD efforts and 
changing levels of inventory at the SSA’s.  It is plausible, however to state that the 
intended decreased inventories have not yet been realized. 
With regard to the Contributing Organizations to SD and their individual 
approaches to logistics, there seems to be a common underpinning that something is 
being overlooked.  Most services and organizations seem to be focused on doing their 
best to fine-tune the logistics system they currently use.  In essence, we keep trying to 
cure an illness without truly addressing the cause of the illness.  There are a great many 
factors driving the current logistics situation; one of which is reliability of equipment.  To 
quote our thesis advisor, instructor and former Assistant Commander for Logistics and 
Fleet Support in the Naval Air Systems Command, Don Eaton, Rear Admiral U.S. Navy, 
(retired), “Reliability isn’t everything…it is the only thing.” [Ref. 27]  His point is a valid 
one… we as logisticians spend our time dealing with mal-developed inventories based on 
highly exaggerated reliability figures of merit.  Many of the Services’ logistics “mission 
statements” support that mentality.  What is vital here is that often the root cause of 
equipment failure is its inherent reliability.  Systems fail sooner than they should, while 
operators and maintainers are forced to support higher actual failure rates rather than 
originally designed failure rates.   Then, under-performing equipment is blamed on the 
logistician’s inability to support those exaggerated MTBF figures. 
Several new programs hint at this mentality such as Reliability-Based Sparing 
(RBS).  Essentially, higher reliability factors are designed into systems and repair parts, 
maximizing system inherent reliability, and then the system can support a demonstrated 
and proven reliability.   To the war fighter, this means they are provided with equipment 
that performs at or better than specified parameters.  Maintainers are provided the right 
set and amount of reliable repair parts to maintain the equipment, and the equipment is 
repaired and mission capable.  Logisticians are provided with accurate reliability data to 
base their inventory structures on and can subsequently provide better support. 
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While we have discussed a few recommendations discussing how increased 
readiness might be achieved through optimization of supply chain processes and 
segments…the real payoff in readiness is achieved through increasing reliability.   
Reliability must be built into systems during the acquisition phase of the life cycle.  An 
article in the Army Logistics magazine pointed out that “sustaining adequate readiness 
through increased reliability is a multifaceted contributing factor to achieving the Army’s 
vision.  Increased reliability of weapons platforms contributes directly to greater combat 
effectiveness; the most lethal weapon is useless if a single mission-critical component 
malfunctions and causes the weapon to be unavailable.”  The article continued by 
highlighting the fact that numerous second-order effects result from improved reliability.  
For example, “fewer equipment failures mean reduced demand for repair parts, which 
means fewer stocks are needed to maintain readiness and fewer personnel are needed to 
manage those stocks.”  [Ref. 28] 
The collective effect of increased reliability is commensurate with JV 2020’s 
vision of an “appropriately-sized and potentially reduced logistics footprint.” [Ref. 6]   
Further supporting the above article’s premise are two theses submitted on the subject of 
reliability by Gregg Dellert and Michael Ryan, (references 29 and 30). Research 
conducted and presented in both of these theses strongly supports the premise that 
readiness is inextricably and very strongly related to reliability of systems and critical 
system components.  [Ref. 29, 30] 
4. Topics for Further Research 
The following research topics warrant further study: 
• Using a broader definition of turbulence, conduct an in-depth analysis of 
monetary and opportunity costs in the ASLs. 
• Further, controlled analysis of the differences between DLA and AMC in 
terms of shipping times from the Depots to the CCPs. 
• Determine and/or compare SD impacts on customers in other theaters and 
Services. 
• Identify and capture the lessons learned from the SD program and research 





LIST OF REFERENCES 
1. Hill, Scott, SDMI Orientation Briefing, United States Transportation Command, 




2. Strategic Distribution Board of Directors Meeting minutes, May 2002.  
<https://business.transcom.mil/J4/SDMI/sdmi_home/meetings/BoD.html> 
 
3. Deputy Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM, Director, Defense Logistics 
Agency.  Strategic Distribution Management Initiative (SDMI) Project Guidance. 
USTRANSCOM/DLA, 17 July 2000. 
 
4. United States Transportation Command and Defense Logistics Agency, Executive 
Agent for. Strategic Distribution Management Initiative (SDMI) Project 
management Plan. USTRANSCOM/DLA, 27 February 2001. 
 
5. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Joint Vision 2010, 1996. 06 August 2002. 
 <http:/www.milnet.com/milnetr/pentagon/jv2010.pdf> 
 
6. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Joint Vision 2020, US Government Printing 
Office, June 2000. 
 
7. Dumond, John [et al] Velocity Management: the Business Paradigm that has 
Transformed the U.S. Army; RAND Corporation, 2001. 
 
8. Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness), 








10. Deputy, Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics), FY2000 DoD Logistics Strategic 
Plan, 1999.  14 August 2002, 
<http://web.deskbook.osd.mil/reflib/mdod/001da/001dadoc.htm> 
 
11. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), An Overview of the Defense Logistics 




12. United States Transportation Command (USTC), United States Transportation 
Command History.  16 August 2002, 
 <http://www.transcom.mil/history/summary.htm> 
 
13. Army Material Command, What We Do.  16August 2002, 
 <http://www.amc.army.mil/about_amc/whatwedo.html> 
 
14. Erwin, Sandra. Logistics Transformation: Army Vows to Make it Work; National 
Defense Magazine, July 2002. 
 
15. Kennedy, Harold, Army Trying to Expedite Flow of Supplies to Troops; National 
Defense Magazine, May 2001. 
 
16. Crytzer, Ira (Fritz). Changing Repair Parts Supply Policy; Army Logistics 
Magazine, March/April 1999. 
 
17. 200TH Materiel Management Center, Theater Logistics Layout & Single Stock 
Fund; Single Stock Fund Power Point Brief, 14 August 2001.  
 <http://www.200mmc.21tsc.army.mil>  
 
18. United States Transportation Command, Program Changes; Strategic Distribution 
Program Changes Power Point Brief, 2-3 May 2002. 
 <https://business.transcom.mil/J4/SDMI/sdmi_home/meetings/BoD/> 
 
19. United States Army, Army Regulation 710-2, Inventory Management Supply 
Policy Below the Wholesale Level, 31 October 1997.  
 
20. United States Army Materiel Command Catalog Data Activity, CDA Pamphlet 
18-1, User-Level Code Reference Guide for the ARMS Monthly, AMDF, and 
I&S History File. 01 June 1991. 
 
21. United States Army, Regulation 725-50 Requisitioning, Receipt and Issue 
System, 15 November 1995. 
 
22. Bastiat, Frederic, Selected Essays on Political Economy. The Foundation for 
Economic Education, Inc. 1995. Trans. Seymour Cain. Ed. George B. de Huszar. 
Library of Economics and Liberty. 12 September 2002.  
 <http://www.econlib.org/library/Bastiat/basEss1.html>. 
 
23. Toothaker, Larry, E. (1993) Multiple Comparison Procedures, Sage University 
Paper series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 07-089. 
Newbury Park, California: Sage. 
 
24. Winograd, Erin Q. What About Army Aviation?; Air Force Magazine, July 2001. 
 
68 
25. United States General Accounting Office, Army Inventory- Parts Shortages are 
Impacting Operations and Maintenance Effectiveness; GAO-01-772, July 2001. 
 
26. Ross, Timothy, CAPT, USN. Strategic Distribution: Transformation Now; 
Defense Logistics Agency. Undated, <www.dla.mil/focusondla/stratdist.htm>  
 
27. Eaton, Don R.  RADM, USN (Ret.). MN4470 Lecture notes, 10 July 2002, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey California.  
 
28. Edwards, Thomas J.and Price, Richard W. Readiness: Year 2000 and Beyond, 
Army Logistics, March April 2000.    
 
29. Dellert, Gregg M. An Analysis of the Impact of Reliability on the Operating and 
Support Costs and Operational Availability of the RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter, 
Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.  
 
30. Ryan, Michael E. The Reliability Challenge: Common Pitfalls and Strategies for 
Maximizing Inherent Reliability Performance of Weapon Systems; Master’s 






















































INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, VA  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  
 
3. RADM(Ret) Don Eaton, Code 36 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 Monterey, CA  
 
4. Professor Ken Doerr, PhD, Code 36 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 Monterey, CA  
 
5. MG Hawthorne Proctor  
Defense Logistics Agency 
Fort Belvoir, VA 
 
6. MG Terry Juskowiak 
United States Army Combined Arms Support Command 
Fort Lee, VA 
 
7. COL Constantine Speros Vakas 
Defense Logistics Agency 
Fort Belvoir, VA 
 
8. Stephanie Pennello 
 Headquarters, Army Materiel Command 
Alexandria, VA  
 
9. Trish Young 
Headquarters, Transportation Command 
Scott Air Force Base, IL 
 
10. Frank Galluzo 







11. Charlie Nye 
Defense Distribution Center 
New Cumberland, PA 
 
12. Thomas Masselink 
Headquarters, Department of the Army 
Washington, DC 
 
13. LTC Anthony Fuller 
Headquarters, Department of the Army 
Washington, DC 
 
14. Vince Trinka 
Defense Logistics Agency 
Fort Belvoir, VA 
 
15. Alan Estevez 
Office of the Secretary of Defense 
Washington, DC 
 
16. LCDR Jeff Schmidt 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  
    
17. CPT Devon NuDelman 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  
 
 
  
